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ABSTRACT
In my dissertation, I focus on resource reallocation problem. Specifically, I consider the housing
market problem. In this problem, there is a group of agents and a group of objects. Each agent owns
at most one object and each object is owned by at most one agent. Agents have preferences over
objects. The goal is to reallocate these objects among agents while satisfying desirable properties;
Pareto efficiency (not possible to make someone better-off without making someone worse-off),
individual rationality (each agent is assigned an object at least as good as her endowment), strategy
proofness (no agent has an incentive to lie) and weak-core selection (no group of agents can trade
among themselves such that each of them becomes better-off). In addition, I consider this problem
while allowing agents to be indifferent between objects.
Recently, favorable results have been established for such problems. It has been proved that
Pareto efficient, weak-core selecting (hence, individually rational) and strategy proof rules exist
for such problems. I consider additional properties for the housing market problem with indiffer-
ences. I show that there are rules which, in addition to the aforementioned properties, satisfy no
justified-envy for agents with identical endowments and weak group strategy proofness even though
Pareto efficiency and group strategy proofness are incompatible under the assumption of indiffer-
ences. I achieve this by providing sufficient conditions for weak group strategy proofness. Then, I
propose a procedural enhancement which prioritizes the outcome achieved without violating strat-
egy proofness. I show that some of the existing rules do not satisfy this criterion. So, I propose a
new mechanism which satisfies this property in addition to other desirable results. Additionally, I
present an amended version of sufficient condition for strategy proofness for housing market problem
with weak preferences.
I also consider random assignment solutions to housing market problem which is referred to
as fractional housing market problem in literature. For general and strict preferences, several
impossibility results have been established for such problems. I show that for a restricted class of
preferences, trichotomous preferences, these impossibility results do not hold.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I provide a brief introduction of the research presented in the following chapters.
This dissertation is a study of the housing market problem. This problem was first modeled by
Shapley & Scarf [28]. In this problem, there is a set of agents and a set of objects. Each agent owns
at most one object and each object is owned by at most one agent. Agents have preferences over
the objects which are to be reassigned. Preferences can be broadly categorized as; general (weak
preferences) and restricted (includes, but not limited to, no indifferences with endowment, strict,
trichotomous, etc). Solution concept for the problem is of the following types: deterministic (an
object is assigned to an agent or not) or random/fractional (an agent can be assigned fractions of
objects).
The second chapter considers housing market problem with weak preferences for deterministic
solutions. The main objective of that chapter is to extend results already established in this setting.
In certain real life applications of housing market problem, social ranking of agents1 could be of
importance i.e. it might be of interest to treat agents with higher social ranking systematically
better in assignment of objects. Social ranking of agents can arise in real-life applications of the
housing market problem: donor lists in organ donor markets; first-come, first-serve criterion for
campus housing and seminar slots; seniority of employees for office assignment, etc. Social ranking
of agents allows us to consider fairness notions for the housing market problem. However, for
deterministic solutions, fairness cannot be examined in a very meaningful manner since an agent
either receives an object or not. A fairness notion that can be considered is no justified-envy for
agents with identical endowments. This property states that for agents with identical endowments2,
the agent with a higher social rank should receive an object she likes at least as much as the
other agent. The existing rules for the housing market problem with weak preferences use priority
orderings over agents and/or objects [3, 14, 27]. An intuitive and simple solution would be to use
social ranking of agents as the priority orderings required by these rules; if the rule requires priority
ordering of agents, use social ranking as the priority ordering whereas if the rule requires priority
ordering of objects, endowments of agents are ranked according to the social rank. As it turns
out, when priority orderings reflect social ranking of agents, rules proposed in [3, 14, 27] satisfy no
1I assume that no two agents are ranked identically under the social ranking.
2Every agent is indifferent between endowments of these agents.
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justified-envy for agents with identical endowments.
Then, I present sufficient conditions for weak group strategy proofness which states that no group
of agents can misreport their preferences such that each of agent in the group becomes better-off.
Additionally, I show that the rule proposed in [3] satisfies weak group strategy proofness. Hence,
for housing market problem with weak preferences, there are rules which are Pareto efficient, weak
core selecting, core selecting (whenever core is non-empty), weakly group strategy proof and satisfy
no justified-envy for agents with identical endowments.
Under weak preferences, housing market problem can have several solutions satisfying the same
desirable properties. Additionally, no justified-envy for agents with identical endowments states
only how agents with identical endowments are treated under the rule. It might be of interest to
direct how the rule selects the solution to these problems. So, I propose a procedural enhancement;
prioritized treatment of market-equal unsatisfied agents. This criterion prioritizes the treatment
of unsatisfied agents during the course of the algorithm while satisfying conditions for strategy
proofness as proposed by Saban & Sethuraman [27]. I show that the existing rules do not satisfy
this property when priority orderings reflect social ranking of agents. Arguably, priority orderings
could be found, in certain situations, such that this property is satisfied by existing rules. However,
this would require finding such priority orderings for each housing market problem which might
not be a trivial task. So, I propose a new rule, Modified Top Cycles rule. I study this rule for
preferences for which there are no indifferences with endowment. The results for this rule show
that for housing market problem, there are rules which are Pareto efficient, weak core selecting,
strategy proof and satisfy no justified-envy for agents with identical endowments and prioritized
treatment of market-equal unsatisfied agents.
Third chapter is a note on Saban & Sethuraman [27]. Using Modified Top Cycles rule, I was
able to identify an oversight in their sufficient conditions for strategy proofness i.e. their result does
not hold in general. Then, I provide three conditions under which results of Saban & Sethuraman
[27] are valid; no indifferences with endowment, ineffective status change of agents and ineffective
status change of objects.
In the final chapter, I consider a random assignment solution to the housing market problem
i.e. in this setting, agents can be assigned fractions of objects. The fractions of objects can be
interpreted as partial ownership of the object or the probability of receiving an object. Random
assignment solution for housing market problem are of interest because fairness can be considered
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in a more meaningful manner in this setting. Since several impossibility results have been reported
for random assignment solutions to housing market problem under weak and strict preferences, I
consider the problem under restricted setting of trichotomous preferences.
For random assignment solutions, preferences of agents need to be extended to random as-
signments. To this end, I employ stochastic dominance relation and use that to define desirable
properties. Using rules in class of mechanisms presented by Saban & Sethuraman [27], I generate
a random assignment solution to the housing market problem for trichotomous preferences. I show
that this rule is efficient, core-stable, strategy proof and satisfies no-envy for agents with identical
endowments, no justified-envy and equal treatment of equals. Therefore, several impossibility results
do not hold under the setting examined in this chapter.
For each of the following chapters, I introduce the problem along with related literature, model
the problem3, report the results with some discussion and finally provide concluding remarks.
3Except for Chapter III for which the model is same as that for Chapter II.
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CHAPTER II
HOUSING MARKET WITH WEAK PREFERENCES: ADDITIONAL
SELECTION CRITERION
Introduction
I consider problem of reallocating objects among a set of agents. Specifically, I consider problems
where each agent has to be assigned (at most) one object and is endowed with (at most) one object.
Agents have preferences over objects and these objects are to be reassigned without any monetary
transfers. Such reallocation problems are referred to as housing market problems in literature and
were first modeled by Shapley & Scarf [28]. This simple economy has several real-life applications
such as allocation of housing [2], offices, seminar slots, and organs for transplant [25].
Top Trading Cycles (TTC) rule, attributed to David Gale, was proposed by Shapley & Scarf [28]
for housing market problems. Under strict preferences, TTC proceeds by repeating the following
until no agent is left in the problem: Each agent points at an agent holding her most preferred
object. Since each agent is pointing at someone and there are finite number of agents, there is
at least one cycle. Each agent in a cycle is assigned object of the agent she is pointing at and
are removed from the problem with this object. The outcome TTC rule satisfies several desirable
properties. Roth & Postlewaite [24] show that TTC outcome is the unique allocation in the core
and it is also the unique competitive allocation. Moreover, TTC mechanism is strategy proof [23],
no agent has an incentive to misreport her preferences, and group strategy proof [7], no group of
agents has an incentive to misreport their preferences such that no agent in the group is made
worse-off and at least one agent is made better-off. Additionally, TTC is the only mechanism which
satisfies Pareto efficiency, individual rationality and strategy proofness [17, 29]. Also, as shown by
Miyagawa [19], TTC is anonymous, independent of how agents are named, and non-bossy, no agent
can influence welfare of other agents without affecting her own welfare.
Considering weak preferences is a natural extension to the housing market problem. Under weak
preferences, agents are allowed to be indifferent between objects. Indifferences among objects can
arise when there is not enough information to break ties. Similarly, an agent might be indifferent
between some objects if those objects are of similar importance to her e.g. organs for transplant
can be identical for an agent when considering properties like blood and tissue type of the donor.
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In accounting for indifferences, some of the desirable properties cannot be achieved. In presence
of indifferences, a core allocation may not exist [28], competitive allocation does not coincide with
core [31] and Pareto efficiency is incompatible with group strategy proofness [12]. Additionally,
Pareto efficiency, individual rationality and strategy proofness are not compatible in general [29].
Moreover, following impossibility results hold under weak preferences: (1) no rule is Pareto efficient,
strategy proof and anonymous, and (2) no rule is Pareto efficient, strategy proof, individually rational
and non-bossy [8, 14].
Moreover, TTC algorithm is limited to strict preferences for agents. An intuitive work around
would be to arbitrarily break ties between objects and then applying TTC algorithm to the resulting
housing market problem with strict preferences. This straightforward rule is weakly Pareto efficient,
individually rational, strategy proof, non-bossy and consistent [13]. Additionally, this rule can be
generalized to agents owning multiple objects [21, 22]. Unfortunately, weak Pareto efficiency is
quite weak in this setting since any assignment in which one agent gets one of her most preferred
objects is weakly Pareto efficient. In fact, examples can be found where no matter how ties are
broken, outcome of TTC with fixed tie-breaking is not Pareto efficient [14].
Even though several desirable results, in case of strict preferences, do not hold for the housing
market problem with weak preferences, some appropriate results can still be achieved since weak
core is non-empty [28] and incompatibility of Pareto efficiency, individual rationality and strategy
proofness holds only under certain assumptions on preference domains [30]. Utilizing this, much
progress has been made recently for the housing market problem with weak preferences. Alcalde-
Unzu & Molis [3] and Jaramillo & Manjunath [14] independently proposed generalizations of TTC
algorithm to account for indifferences; Top Trading Absorbing Sets (TTAS) rule and Top Cycles
(TC) rule , respectively. Both these rules are Pareto efficient, individually rational, strategy proof,
weak core selecting and core selecting (whenever core is non-empty) [3, 6, 14]. Moreover, TC has
a polynomial running time whereas TTAS has an exponential running time in the worst possible
case [6, 14]. Saban & Sethuraman [27] establish sufficient conditions for strategy proofness and
employ that condition to come up with fast algorithms. They provide a class of rules for which
each member satisfies Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, weak core selection and strategy
proofness, namely; common ordering on agents, individual ordering on objects (CAIO). Moreover,
they propose a member from this class of rules, Highest Priority Object (HPO) rule, which has a
polynomial running time.
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Algorithms for the three rules are quite similar. Each rule is iterative where each step consists of
three phases; departure, pointing and trading. In the departure phase, a group of agents are chosen
to depart in a manner so that there are no beneficial trades possible involving any agent from the
departing group. When agents are allowed to be indifferent between objects, it possible to have
multiple most preferred objects. Each of these rules employ priority ordering over agents and/or
objects to determine a unique pointee for each agent in the pointing phase. In the trading phase,
objects are exchanged according to the cycles formed in pointing phase.
In real-life applications of the housing market problem, social rankings of agents might arise
e.g. seniority of people in office assignment problem, donor lists in organ donor market, first-come,
first-served criterion in on-campus housing problem, etc. It might be of interest to treat agents
with higher social ranking better than agents with lower social ranking. A simple solution would
be to use social ranking of agents as priority orderings for the existing rules. Specifically, for rules
which use priority ordering of agents, social ranking of agents can be used as the priority orderings
and rules which use priority ordering of objects, social ranking of agents could be used to rank
endowments of agents. Then, it might be of interest to determine if these rules satisfy some fairness
criterion associated with social ranking of agents because using certain priority orderings could
potentially lead to systematic favoring of some agents. No justified-envy for agents with identical
endowments is an appropriate fairness criterion for the housing market problem. This property
states that if agents have identical endowments, then agent with higher social ranking should be
favored by the mechanism.
Next, I show that even though group strategy proofness is incompatible with Pareto efficiency,
weak group strategy proofness can still be achieved for the housing market problem with weak
preferences. I present two sufficient conditions for weak group strategy proofness and show that
TTAS is weakly group strategy proof.
Finally, I propose a procedural enhancement which I refer to as prioritized treatment of market-
equals unsatisfied agents. This property prioritizes trading cycles which occur at each step based
on priority ordering of agents and/or objects without violating strategy proofness. I show that TC,
TTAS and HPO rules do not satisfy this property. So, I propose a rule which satisfies this property
along with other desirable properties.
To the best of my knowledge, additional properties for housing market problem with weak
preferences have not been explored as of yet. In the next section, I present the model and provide
6
some relevant notation.
Model
Let N be set of agents and O be set of objects. Without loss of generality, it can be assumed
that |N | = |O| [14]. Each agent is endowed with an object and that object is denoted by the
bijection ω : N → O. For each i ∈ N , agent i's endowment is denoted as ω (i) and for any M ⊆ N ,
let ω(M) ≡ ∪i∈M {ω (i)}.
Let R be set of all possible preference relations over O. For a given R ∈ RN , preference relation
for i ∈ N is denoted as Ri and for each a, b ∈ O; (1) a being at least as good as b for agent i is
represented as aRib, (2) a being preferred to b by agent i is represented as aPib and (3) agent i
being indifferent between a and b is denoted as aIib. R−i is used to denote preferences of everyone
other than agent i. For any M ⊆ N , RM denotes preferences of everyone in M and R−M denotes
preferences of everyone other than M . For any R ∈ RN , i ∈ N and O′ ⊆ O, let τ (Ri, O′) represent
agent i's most preferred objects in O′ under Ri. Formally, τ (Ri, O′) ≡ {a ∈ O′ : aRib ∀b ∈ O′}.
Let A be set of all possible allocations i.e. it contains all bijections from N to O. For any
allocation α ∈ A, let object allocated to person i under α be denoted as α(i). Moreover, for any
M ⊆ N , let α(M) ≡ ∪i∈M{α(i)}.
Priority orderings over objects and agents are required for the housing market problem with
weak preferences. Let ≺ denote some complete, transitive and antisymmetric priority ordering over
agents in N or over objects in O. With slight abuse of notation, I use same notation for priority
ordering of agents or objects. For ordering over agents, ≺, agent i has higher priority ordering than
agent j if i ≺ j. For ordering over objects, ≺, object a has higher priority ordering than object b if
a ≺ b.
The quadruple (O,N, ω,R) denotes a housing market problem with set of agents N , objects O,
endowment ω and preference profile R. An allocation rule, ϕ : RN × A → A, gives an allocation
for a given housing market problem.
Let ϕ : RN×A→ A be a rule which is iterative and each of its steps has three phases: departure,
pointing and trading. In the departure phase, some agents and objects are chosen to be removed
from the problem. In the pointing phase, each (or some) agent points at a unique agent and in
trading phase, agents trade objects in accordance with the cycles formed in the pointing phase. For
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any step t, pϕt (i) will denote the agent pointed at by agent i in pointing phase of ϕ at step t. Let
hϕt (i) be the object held by agent i at beginning of step t under ϕ. Moreover, for any M ⊆ N ,
let hϕt (M) ≡ ∪i∈M {hϕt (i)}. Let Nϕt and Oϕt be set of agents and objects, respectively, remaining
after departure phase of ϕ in step t. Any i ∈ Nϕt is said to be satisfied if hϕt (i) ∈ τ (Ri, Oϕt ). Let
Sϕt be set of all satisfied agents in N
ϕ
t . Any agent i ∈ Nϕt who is not satisfied is referred to as an
unsatisfied agent and set of all unsatisfied agents in Nϕt are denoted as U
ϕ
t . At step t, let G
ϕ
t denote
the graph where there is a directed arc from each i ∈ Nϕt to j ∈ Nϕt such that hϕt (j) ∈ τ (Ri, Oϕt ).
In the next section, I formally describe some desirable properties for allocations in the housing
market problem.
Some Properties
Consider any (R,ω) ∈ RN × A. An allocation α ∈ A Pareto dominates β ∈ A if α(i)Riβ(i) for
all i ∈ N and α(j)Pjβ(j) for some j ∈ N . An allocation rule, ϕ : RN × A→ A, is Pareto efficient
if for all (R,ω) ∈ RN ×A, ϕ (R,ω) is not Pareto dominated by any allocation in A.
An allocation rule, ϕ, is individually rational if for all (R,ω) ∈ RN×A and i ∈ N , ϕ (R,ω) (i)Riω (i)
i.e. each agent receives an object at least as good as her endowment.
An allocation rule is strategy proof if no agent has an incentive to misreport her preferences i.e.
for each i ∈ N , R ∈ RN and R′i ∈ R, ϕ (R,ω) (i)Riϕ (R′, ω) (i) where R′ = (R−i, R′i).
An allocation rule is weakly group strategy proof if no group of agents can misreport preferences
such that every agent in the group is made better-off i.e. for anyM ⊆ N , there are no R ∈ RN and
R′M ∈ RM such that ϕ (R′, ω) (i)Piϕ (R,ω) (i) for each i ∈ M where R′ = (R−M , R′M ). It should
be obvious that weak group strategy proofness implies strategy proofness but converse is not true in
general.
For each allocation α ∈ A and M ⊆ N , α is said to be blocked by M if ∃β ∈ A such that
β(M) = ω(M) and for each i ∈M , β(i)Piα(i). An allocation α ∈ A is said to be weakly blocked by
M ⊆ N if ∃β ∈ A such that β (M) = ω (M), β (i)Riα (i) for all i ∈ M and β (j)Pjα (j) for some
j ∈ M . An allocation is in the weak core if it is not blocked by any subset of N . An allocation is
in the core if it is not weakly blocked by any subset of N . An allocation rule is said to be weak core
selecting if it always finds allocations in the weak core and core selecting if it finds allocations in
the core whenever the core is non-empty.
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Existing Rules
In this section, I briefly describe three of the existing mechanisms proposed for housing market
problem with weak preferences. First, I present the common departure condition for the three rules.
Then, I describe the properties required for sufficient conditions of strategy proofness as given by
Saban & Sethuraman [27]. Finally, I describe the pointing phase of each of the three rules.
Departure Condition
At each step of the algorithm, agents and objects are chosen to depart. Unlike TTC rule, in
presence of indifferences among objects, agents cannot be allowed to depart after they have been
part of a trading cycle since some beneficial trades might still be possible. So, in order to achieve
Pareto efficiency, following departure condition is used for the existing rules and I state it for a
general rule ϕ: A group of agents is selected to depart if every person in the group is satisfied
and the group, as a whole, owns all their most preferred objects among the remaining objects.
Formally, a set of agents, M , is chosen to depart at step t if hϕt (i) ∈ τ (Ri, O′) for all i ∈ M and
hϕt (M) = ∪i∈Mτ (Ri, O′) where O′ ⊆ Oϕt−1 and Oϕt−1\O′ are the objects removed at step t before
group M is chosen for departure. The process is repeated until no other group of agents satisfies
the departure condition.
This departure condition is equivalent to condition of paired-symmetric absorbing sets used for
TTAS by Alcalde-Unzu & Molis [3] and terminal sinks used for HPO by Saban & Sethuraman
[27]. This condition ensures Pareto efficiency for these rules because all possible beneficial trades
are exhausted.
Independence of Unsatisfied Agents and Persistence
Saban & Sethuraman [27] establish sufficient conditions for strategy proofness. They show that
independence of unsatisfied agents and persistence play an important role for strategy proofness of
rules for housing market problem under weak preferences. I present these properties for a general
rule ϕ.
Independence of unsatisfied agents states that pointing phase should be independent of most
preferred objects (among the remaining ones) of unsatisfied agents. Consider any step t and i ∈ Uϕt ,
then by independence of unsatisfied agents, changing outgoing edges of agent i in Gϕt should not
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change the unique pointee selected for any j ∈ Nϕt \ {i}.
Persistence states that if an unsatisfied agent was pointed at (directly or indirectly) by some
agents, then those agents should keep on pointing (directly or indirectly) at that agent until the
unsatisfied agent becomes part of a trading cycle or leaves the problem. Formally, if at step t, there
is {i1, · · · , im} ⊆ Nϕt such that pϕt (ir) = ir+1 for all r ∈ {1, · · · ,m− 1}, im ∈ Uϕt and t′ > t be
the first step agent im becomes part of a trading cycle or leaves the problem, then p
ϕ
t¨
(ir) = ir+1
for all r ∈ {1, · · · ,m− 1}, t¨ ∈ {t, · · · , t′ − 1}, if agent im departs at step t′, and t¨ ∈ {t, · · · , t′}, if
agent im becomes part of a trading cycle at step t′. This condition ensures that any object made
available to an unsatisfied agent once, should remain available to that agent until she becomes part
of a trading cycle or leaves the problem.
Top Cycles Rule
In this section, I briefly describe Top Cycles (TC) rule proposed by Jaramillo & Manjunath
[14] and provide some relevant notation. Let ≺ be some priority ordering of agents. Step t of the
algorithm is as follows:
1. Group of agents satisfying departure condition are chosen to depart until no more group of
agents satisfy the departure condition. Each departing agent is assigned the object she is
holding i.e. if agent i was chosen to depart, then agent i is assigned hTCt (i).
2. Each agent points at an agent holding one of her most preferred objects among the remaining
objects. If there are more than one such agents, the unique agent pointed at is determined in
the following manner:
(a) (TC-persistence) For any agent j who holds the same object as in the previous step,
agents pointing at agent j in the previous step, point at agent j in the current step i.e.
if hTCt (j) = h
TC
t−1 (j), for each i ∈ NTCt such that pTCt−1 (i) = j, pTCt (i) = j4.
(b) If at least one of the most preferred objects of an agent is held by an unsatisfied agent,
that agent points at the unsatisfied agent with the highest priority under ≺.
(c) Any agent who is not pointing must have all her most preferred objects held by satisfied
agents. If some of those satisfied agents point at an unsatisfied agent, the agent points
4TC rule explicitly enforces persistence. However, TC-persistence is more restrictive than persistence and might
result in some cycles not having any unsatisfied agents [27].
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at whoever points at the higher priority unsatisfied agent. If two or more satisfied agents
point at the unsatisfied agent with highest priority, the agent points at the satisfied agent
having a higher priority under ≺. If none of the satisfied agents point at an unsatisfied
agents, the agent points at whoever points at someone who points at an unsatisfied agent
with the highest priority. If two or more satisfied agents point at someone who points at
the unsatisfied agent with highest priority, among these agents, the agent points at the
satisfied agent with a higher priority and so on.
(d) Any agent unable to reach an unsatisfied agent points at the highest priority agent, other
than herself, holding one of her most preferred objects.
3. Since at each step, every agent is pointing at someone, there is at least one cycle among the
remaining agents. In the next step of TC rule, every agent in a cycle holds object of the agent
she was pointing at i.e. if agent i is part of a trading cycle at step t, hTCt+1 (i) = h
TC
t
(
pTCt (i)
)
.
The second phase of TC ensures that each cycle has at least one unsatisfied person in absence of
TC-persistent pointing. For any (R,ω) ∈ RN × A and priority ordering ≺, outcome of TC rule is
denoted as TC≺ (R,ω). TC rule is Pareto efficient, individually rational, strategy proof, weak core
selecting and core selecting (whenever core is non-empty) [6, 14]. Moreover, it has been shown to
have a polynomial running time[14].
Top Trading Absorbing Sets Rule
I briefly describe TTAS rule given by Alcalde-Unzu & Molis [3]. Let ≺ be some ordering over
objects.
There is a path from node v to node v′ if there are nodes {v1, · · · , vm} such that there is an
arc from vl−1 to vl for all l ∈ {2, · · · ,m}, v1 = v and vm = v′. A set of nodes, V , is said to be
an absorbing set if for all v, v′ ∈ V , there is a path from v to v′ and for each v ∈ V , there is no
path from v to some v′ /∈ V . Absorbing set V is paired-symmetric if for all v ∈ V , ∃v′ ∈ V such
that there is an arc from v to v′ and an arc from v′ to v. Step t of the algorithm proceeds in the
following manner5:
5Even though for TTAS rule, each agent points at an object and each object points at an agent, I describe the
rule such that agents are pointing at agents for notational congruity.
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1. Each remaining agent points at each agent holding one of her most preferred objects (among
the remaining ones) i.e. each i ∈ NTTASt points at all agents who own an object in τ
(
Ri, O
TTAS
t
)
,.
2. Group of agents are chosen to depart according to the departure condition until no more
group of agents satisfy departure condition. Each departing agent is assigned the object she
is holding i.e. if agent i was chosen to depart, then agent i is assigned hTTASt (i).
3. Now consider remaining absorbing sets, if any. For each agent in the absorbing set with
multiple most preferred objects (among the remaining ones), a unique agent is chosen to
point at in the following manner: among the most preferred objects that have not been
assigned to the agent yet, the agent points at the agent who owns the object with the highest
priority ordering under ≺. If all most preferred objects have been assigned to the agent at
least m times, the agent points at the agent who owns the highest priority most preferred
object which has not been assigned to her m + 1 times. For this criterion, endowment of an
agent is considered as a previously assigned object.
4. Since each agent, in an absorbing set, is pointing at an object there is at least one cycle. Each
agent and object in a cycle are kept in the algorithm. However, in step t+ 1, each agent in a
cycle is assigned the object she was pointing at in the cycle i.e. if agent i is in a cycle at step
t, hTTASt+1 (i) = h
TTAS
t
(
pTTASt (i)
)
.
(3) and (4) can be considered as pointing and trading phase of TTAS, respectively. The al-
gorithm ends when every agent and object has departed. For any (R,ω) ∈ RN × A and priority
ordering of objects ≺, outcome of TTAS rule will be denoted as TTAS≺ (R,ω). TTAS rule is
Pareto efficient, individually rational, strategy proof, weak core selecting and core selecting (when-
ever core is non-empty) [3]. However, TTAS rule can have an exponential running time in the
worst possible case [6].
Highest Priority Object Rule
I briefly describeHPO rule proposed by Saban and Sethuraman [27]. HPO rule requires priority
ordering over objects which is then used to induce an ordering over agents at each step. However,
the induced ordering of agents is not used for HPO rule and was used only to show that HPO
belongs to the class of rules; common ordering on agents, individual ordering on objects [27]. So,
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I ignore induced ordering of agents in the following description. Let ≺ be some priority ordering
over objects. Step t of HPO proceeds as follows:
1. Group of agents are chosen to depart according to the departure condition until no more
agents satisfy departure condition. Each departing agent is assigned the object she is holding
i.e. if agent i was chosen to depart, then agent i is assigned hHPOt (i).
2. Unique pointee for each agent in NHPOt is determined in the following manner:
(a) (Persistence) For any i ∈ UHPOt , if there are {i1, · · · , im} ⊆ NHPOt−1 such that pHPOt−1 (ir) =
ir+1 for all r ∈ {1, · · · ,m− 1} and pHPOt−1 (im) = i, then pHPOt (ir) = ir+1 for all
r ∈ {1, · · · ,m− 1} and pHPOt (im) = i.
(b) For each i ∈ UHPOt who is not pointing yet, letM ⊆ NHPOt be such that for each j ∈M ,
hHPOt (j) ∈ τ
(
Ri, O
HPO
t
)
. Then, agent i points at the agent in M who owns the highest
priority object under ≺.
(c) Repeat the following until everyone is pointing: agents who are already pointing at
someone are referred to as labeled agents and denoted as L. Moreover, agents adjacent
to labeled agents are denoted as AL i.e. for each i ∈ AL, there is j ∈ L such that
hHPOt (j) ∈ τ
(
Ri, O
HPO
t
)
. Select the agent in AL who owns the highest priority object,
say agent i. Let M ⊆ L be such that for each j ∈M , hHPOt (j) ∈ τ
(
Ri, O
HPO
t
)
. Then,
agent i points at an agent in M who owns the highest priority object i.e. pHPOt (i) = j
if for each j, j′ ∈ M , j 6= j′ and hHPOt (j) ≺ hHPOt (j′). Add agent i to L and each
j ∈ NHPOt \L such that hHPOt (i) ∈ τ
(
Rj , O
HPO
t
)
to AL.
3. Since each agent is pointing, there is at least one cycle of remaining agents and by (2), each
cycle has at least one unsatisfied agent. In the next step of HPO rule, each agent in a cycle
holds object of the agent she was pointing at i.e. if agent i is part of a trading cycle at step
t, hHPOt+1 (i) = h
HPO
t
(
pHPOt (i)
)
.
For any (R,ω) ∈ RN × A and priority ordering of objects ≺, outcome of HPO rule is denoted
as HPO≺ (R,ω). HPO rule is Pareto efficient, individually rational, strategy proof and weak
core selecting [27]. Moreover, HPO rule can be implemented in O
(
n2 log n+ n2γ
)
where γ is the
maximum number of objects agents are indifferent between for a given preference list.
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Results for Existing Rules
In this section, I present results for the existing rules. First, I present a fairness criterion, no
justified-envy for agents with identical endowments, and show that it is satisfied by TC, TTAS
and HPO rules. Next, I show that TTAS satisfies weak group strategy proofness and also present
selection criteria which induces weak group strategy proofness. I show that TTAS satisfies one of
these sufficient conditions and hence, is weakly group strategy proof. Then, I present a procedural
enhancement which prioritizes the trades occurring during the algorithm while satisfying strategy
proofness. I show that this criterion is not satisfied by TC, TTAS or HPO rule.
No Justified-Envy for Agents with Identical Endowments
In real-life applications of housing market problem, social ranking of agents might arise and it
might be of interest to treat agents in accordance with this ranking. Examples of social rankings
arising in housing market problems are as follows: seniority of employees in office assignment,
donor lists in organ donor market, first-come, first-serve criterion for on-campus housing, etc. The
aforementioned rules, TC, TTAS and HPO, make use of priority ordering of agents or objects.
So, which priority ordering should be used for a given housing market problem for these rules?
An intuitive and simple solution to this question would be to use the social ranking of agents as
the priority ordering. If priority ordering is over agents, it could be same as social ranking of
agents whereas if priority ordering is over objects, social ranking of agents can be used to induce
an ordering of objects in the following manner: if agent i has a higher social ranking than agent j,
then ω (i) has a higher priority ordering than ω (j).
Then, a fairness notion of interest could be that a higher priority agent should receive an
object she likes at least as much as that of a lower priority agent when endowments of these
agents are considered to be identical by everyone. Formally, a rule ϕ with priority ordering ≺
over agents or objects, ϕ : RN × A → A satisfies no justified-envy for agents with identical en-
dowments if for any i, j ∈ N such that i ≺ j or ω (i) ≺ ω (j) and ω (i) Ikω (j) for all k ∈ N , then
ϕ≺ (R,ω) (i)Riϕ≺ (R,ω) (j). As it turns out, no justified-envy for agents with identical endowments
is satisfied by TC, TTAS and HPO rules when priority ordering reflects social ranking of agents.
Proposition 2.1. For ordering ≺ and any (R,ω) ∈ RN×A, TC, TTAS and HPO rules satisfy
no justified-envy for agents with identical endowments.
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Proof. Let ϕ be some individually rational rule. If there are i, j ∈ N such that i ≺ j or
ω (i) ≺ ω (j), ω (i) Ikω (j) for each k ∈ N and ϕ (j)Piϕ (i), then it cannot be that ϕ (j) = ω (j)
since then ω (i)Piϕ (i). So, ϕ (j) 6= ω (j). For TC, TTAS and HPO rules, this implies that agent
j is part of a trading cycle at least once.
(TC rule) On contrary, there is (R,ω) ∈ RN × A, ordering over agents ≺, i, j ∈ N such that
i ≺ j and ω (i) Ikω (j) for all k ∈ N but α (j)Piα (i) where α ≡ TC≺ (R,ω). Let t be the first
step agent j becomes part of a trading cycle. So, hTCt (j) = ω (j) and α (j) ∈ τ
(
Rj , O
TC
t
)
. It
must be the case that i has neither departed nor been part a trading cycle for any t′ ≤ t i.e.
hTCt (i) = ω (i). If i departed in some t
′ ≤ t, then α (i)Rib for all b ∈ OTCt′ and since OTCt ⊆ OTCt′−1,
α (i)Riα (j). If i has been part of a trading cycle for some t′ ≤ t, then α (i) ∈ τ
(
Ri, O
TC
t′
)
and
since OTCt ⊆ OTCt′ , we again have a contradiction. Moreover, it cannot be the case that agent i
is satisfied at step t because if ω (i) ∈ τ (Ri, OTCt ), ω (i)Riα (j). Now, let k ∈ NTCt be the agent
pointing at agent j in the trading cycle including agent j. Then, ω (j) ∈ τ (Rk, OTCt ) and since
ω (i) Ikω (j), ω (i) ∈ τ
(
Rk, O
TC
t
)
. Since agent k is not pointing at agent i, it must be the case that
agent k is pointing at agent j by TC-persistence of pointing phase. Let tk < t be the first step
agent k points at agent j. Since ω (i) , ω (j) ∈ τ (Rk, Otk), i, j ∈ UTCtk and i ≺ j, it cannot be the
case that agent k points at agent j in step tk.
(TTAS rule) On contrary, there exists (R,ω) ∈ RN ×A, ordering over objects ≺, i, j ∈ N such
that ω (i) ≺ ω (j) and ω (i) Ikω (j) for all k ∈ N but α (j)Piα (i) where α ≡ TTAS≺ (R,ω). Let t be
the first step agent j is part of a cycle. So, we have hTTASt (j) = ω (j) and α (j) ∈ τ
(
Rj , O
TTAS
t
)
.
It cannot be the case that agent i has departed at some t′ ≤ t since then α (i)Rib for all b ∈ OTTASt′
and so, α (i)Riα (j) because OTTASt ⊆ OTTASt′ . Also, agent i could not have been part of a cycle
at some t′ ≤ t since then α (i) ∈ τ (Ri, OTTASt′ ) and α (i)Riα (j) because OTTASt ⊆ OTTASt′ . So,
hTTASt (i) = ω (i). Now, let k ∈ NTTASt be the agent pointing at agent j in the cycle containing
agent j. Let S be the absorbing set containing agents j and k. It must be the case that the agent
i is in this absorbing set as well because there is a path from agent k to agent i. Neither ω (i) nor
ω (j) have been assigned to agent k previously since agents i and j have not been part of a cycle
before t. Then, it cannot be the case that agent k points at agent j in step t because ω (i) ≺ ω (j).
(HPO rule) On contrary, there exist (R,ω) ∈ RN × A, ordering over objects ≺, i, j ∈ N such
that ω (i) ≺ ω (j) and ω (i) Ikω (j) for all k ∈ N but α (j)Piα (i) where α ≡ HPO≺ (R,ω). Let t be
the first step agent j is part of a trading cycle. Then, we have hHPOt (j) = ω (j). Since α (j)Piα (i),
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it cannot be the case that agent i departed at or became part of a trading cycle at some step t′ ≤ t.
So, hHPOt (i) = ω (i). Moreover, i ∈ UHPOt . Let k be the agent pointing at agent j in the trading
cycle consisting of agent j. Note that it must be the case that agent k is persistently pointing at
agent j because (1) if k ∈ UHPOt , agent k points at whoever owns a higher priority object among
agents holding one of agent k's most preferred objects and since ω (i) ≺ ω (j), pHPOt (k) 6= j, and
(2) if k ∈ SHPOt , whenever unique pointee of agent k is to be determined, agent k cannot point at
agent j because ω (i) ≺ ω (j) and agent i is always labeled because i ∈ UHPOt .
Let tk < t be the first step agent k points at agent j. If k ∈ UHPOtk , agent k points at whoever
owns a higher priority object among agents holding one of agent k's most preferred objects and since
ω (i) Ikω (j) and ω (i) ≺ ω (j), it cannot be the case that pHPOtk (k) = j. If k ∈ SHPOtk , whenever
unique pointee of agent k is to be determined, agent k cannot point at agent j because ω (i) ≺ ω (j)
and agent i is already labeled because i ∈ UHPOtk . This completes the proof. 
Weak Group Strategy Proofness
Even though group strategy proofness is incompatible with Pareto efficiency for the housing
market problem under weak preferences [12], weak group strategy proofness is still compatible with
Pareto efficiency as I show in this subsection.
For notational simplicity, I drop ϕ in the superscript. Let R,R′ ∈ RN . At step t of rule ϕ,
let Nt (resp. N ′t) and Ot (resp. O
′
t) be set of remaining agents and objects, respectively, after
departure phase of step t under R (resp. R′). Let pt (i) (resp. p′t (i)) denote the agent pointed at
by agent i at step t under R (resp. R′). Let ht (i) (resp. h′t (i)) denote the object held by agent i
at step t under R (resp. R′). For any R ∈ RN , let Ci (R, t) denote set of all agents having a path
to agent i at step t, under preferences R, via pointing (including agent i) i.e.
Ci (R, t) ≡

j ∈ Nt :
j = i,
pt (j) = i,
pt (pt (j)) = i,
...
Independence of unsatisfied agents is defined for one unsatisfied agent. However, if a rule satisfies
this property, it holds for multiple unsatisfied agents as well. Consider the following: Let G0 be some
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TTC−graph and {i1, · · · , im} be some set of unsatisfied agents. Let G1, · · · , Gm be TTC−graphs
such thatGk andG0 differ only in outgoing edges from agents i1, · · · , ik for each k ∈ {1, · · · ,m}. Let
F be the unique pointee selection criterion under rule ϕ which satisfies independence of unsatisfied
agents. Since Gk−1 and Gk differ only in outgoing edges from agent ik, F (Gk−1) and F (Gk) differ
only in outgoing edge from agent ik, by independence of unsatisfied agents, for all k ∈ {1, · · · ,m}.
Then, graphs F (G0) and F (Gm) differ only in outgoing edges from agents i1, · · · , im. However,
independence of unsatisfied agents may not be enough to ensure weak group strategy proofness. So,
I introduce a stronger notion of independence.
Comprehensive Independence of Agents: Let G1 and G2 be two TTC−graphs which differ
only in outgoing edges of an agent i. Let F be the unique pointee selection criterion under rule ϕ
where F (G) represents graph obtained after applying F criterion to graph G. Then, rule ϕ satisfies
comprehensive independence of agents if F (G1) and F (G2) differ only in outgoing edge from agent
i.
In contrast to independence of unsatisfied agents, comprehensive independence of agents holds
for all agents rather than just for unsatisfied agents. Hence, comprehensive independence of agents
implies independence of unsatisfied agents. Similar to independence of unsatisfied agents, compre-
hensive independence of agents also holds for multiple agents. Similar to independence of unsatisfied
agents, consider the following: Let G0 be some TTC−graph and {i1, · · · , im} be any set of agents.
Let G1, · · · , Gm be TTC−graphs such that Gk and G0 differ only in outgoing edges from agents
i1, · · · , ik for each k ∈ {1, · · · ,m}. Let F be the unique pointee selection criterion under rule ϕ
which satisfies comprehensive independence of agents. Since Gk−1 and Gk differ only in outgo-
ing edges from agent ik, F (Gk−1) and F (Gk) differ only in outgoing edge from agent ik for all
k ∈ {1, · · · ,m}, by comprehensive independence of agents. Then, graphs F (G0) and F (Gm) differ
only in outgoing edges from agents i1, · · · , im.
Now, I introduce a notion which restricts how unique pointee selection criterion, F , operates
when a group of agents are misreporting their preferences. I refer to this notion as consistent
pointing and it is defined below.
Consistent Pointing: Consider any R ∈ RN and let R′ = (R−M , R′M ) for any M ⊆ N . Let
t (resp. t′) be the first step an agent in M departs, becomes satisfied or becomes part of a trading
cycle under R (resp. R′). Suppose that t′ < t. Let CM (R, ·) = ∪i∈MCi (R, ·). Suppose there is
step t˜ < t such that for all t¨ < t˜:
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1.
N ′
t¨
⊆ Nt¨
Nt¨\N ′t¨ ⊆ CM
(
R, t¨− 1) and O
′
t¨
⊆ Ot¨
Ot¨\O′t¨ ⊆ ht¨
(
CM
(
R, t¨− 1)) ,
2. for all j ∈ Nt¨\CM
(
R, t¨
)
, pt¨ (j) = p
′
t¨
(j), and
3. for all j ∈ Nt¨\CM
(
R, t¨
)
, ht¨+1 (j) = h
′
t¨+1
(j), then
if N ′
t˜
⊆ Nt˜, Nt˜\N ′t˜ ⊆ CM
(
R, t˜− 1), O′
t˜
⊆ Ot˜, and Ot˜\O′t˜ ⊆ ht˜
(
CM
(
R, t˜− 1)), then the unique
pointee selection criterion for rule ϕ is said to be consistent if pt˜ (j) = p
′
t˜
(j) for each j ∈ Nt˜\CM
(
R, t˜
)
.
If unique pointee selection criterion of rule ϕ is consistent, I say that the rule ϕ satisfies consistent
pointing.
Proposition 2.2. An individually rational rule satisfying comprehensive independence of
agents, persistence and consistent pointing properties satisfies weak group strategy proofness.
Proof. On contrary, suppose there isM ⊆ N and R′M ∈ RM such that ϕ (R′, ω) (i)Piϕ (R,ω) (i)
for all i ∈ M where R′ = (R−M , R′M ) where ϕ is an individually rational rule. Let α ≡ ϕ (R,ω)
and α′ ≡ ϕ (R′, ω). Let t (resp. t′) be the first step in ϕ under R (resp. R′) where either of the
following is true for some agent i ∈M :
1. i departs at step t (resp. t′) under R (resp. R′),
2. i becomes satisfied at step t (resp. t′) under R (resp. R′), or
3. i becomes part of a trading cycle at step t (resp. t′) under R (resp. R′).
Claim 1. α′ (i)Piω (i) for each i ∈M .
Proof. By individual rationality of ϕ, α (i)Riω (i) for each i ∈ N . By initial assumption,
α′ (i)Piα (i) for all i ∈M . Then, it must be the case that α′ (i)Piω (i) for all i ∈M .
So, it must be the case that each agent inM becomes part of a trading cycle at least once under
R′. So, t′ represents the first step an agent in M becomes satisfied or becomes part of a trading
cycle under R′. 
Claim 2. No agent in M departs at step 1 of ϕ under either R or R′.
Proof. This follows for R′ directly from Claim 1. On contrary, suppose some agent inM departs
at step 1 under R. Let i ∈M be the first such agent. Let Ni,1 be set of agents who departed before
agent i at step 1. Since these agents depart without ever trading, we have α (j) = ω (j) for all
j ∈ Ni,1. Since α′ (i)Piα (i), owing to the departure condition, some agent in Ni,1 would have to be
18
made strictly worse off under R′. This violates individual rationality of rule ϕ because α (j) = ω (j)
for all j ∈ Ni,1. 
Claim 3. No agent in M is satisfied at step 1 under R.
Proof. Note that if ω (i) ∈ τ (Ri, O1) for some i ∈ M , then, by departure condition, i can be
made strictly better off under R′ only if some person in N\N1 is made strictly worse off. This
violates individual rationality because α (j) = ω (j) for all j ∈ N\N1. 
Claim 4. Nt˜ = N
′
t˜
, Ot˜ = O
′
t˜
, ht˜ = h
′
t˜
and for j ∈ Nt˜\M , pt˜ (j) = p′t˜ (j) for all t˜ < t = min {t, t′}.
Moreover, ht = h′t. Also, if no agent in M departs at step t under R, Nt = N
′
t and Ot = O
′
t
6.
Proof. If t = 1, the claim holds vacuously. Now suppose that t > 1. Consider t˜ = 1. No one in
M departs at step 1 under either R or R′ (Claims 1-2). Then, set of departing agents and objects
should be the same because R′j = Rj for all j ∈ N\M . So, N1 = N ′1 and O1 = O′1. Moreover, each
agent holds her endowment at step 1 so that h1 = h′1. By comprehensive independence of agents,
we have p1 (j) = p′1 (j) for each j ∈ N1\M .
Now, suppose claim holds for some t˜ < t − 1. We want to show that the claim is true for step
t˜ + 1. By assumption, we have Nt˜ = N
′
t˜
, Ot˜ = O
′
t˜
, ht˜ = h
′
t˜
and pt˜ (j) = p
′
t˜
(j) for each j ∈ Nt˜\M .
Since t˜ < t, no agent in M is part of a trading cycle under either R or R′ at step t˜. So, same
cycles occur under both R and R′ because pt˜ (j) = p
′
t˜
(j) for each j ∈ Nt˜\M . Hence, ht˜+1 = h′t˜+1.
Since t˜ + 1 < t, no agent in M departs at step t˜ + 1 under either R or R′. So, Nt˜+1 = N
′
t˜+1
and
Ot˜+1 = O
′
t˜+1
because ht˜+1 = h
′
t˜+1
and R′j = Rj for all j ∈ N\M . By persistence and comprehensive
independence of agents, pt˜+1 (j) = p
′
t˜+1
(j) for all j ∈ Nt˜+1\M .
To show that ht = h′t, we simply need to show that ht˜+2 = h
′
t˜+2
. Since t˜ + 1 < t, no agent in
M is part of a trading cycle at step t˜ + 1 under R and R′. Then, same cycles occur under R and
R′ at step t˜+ 1 because pt˜+1 (j) = p
′
t˜+1
(j) for all j ∈ Nt˜+1\M and so, we have ht˜+2 = h′t˜+2.
Now, we show that last part of the claim holds true. Since ht = h′t and no agent in M departs
at step t under either R (by assumption) or R′ (Claim 1), same agents depart at step t under R
and R′ because R′j = Rj for all j ∈ N\M . Hence, Nt = N ′t and Ot = O′t. 
Claim 5. Suppose t′ < t. For any step t˜ and R ∈ RN , let CM
(
R, t˜
)
= ∪i∈MCi
(
R, t˜
)
. Then,
for all t˜ ∈ {t′, · · · , t− 1}:
1.
N ′
t˜
⊆ Nt˜
Nt˜\N ′t˜ ⊆ CM
(
R, t˜− 1) and O
′
t˜
⊆ Ot˜
Ot˜\O′t˜ ⊆ ht˜
(
CM
(
R, t˜− 1)) ,
6It should be noted that the proof for Claim 4 does not require the rule to satisfy consistent pointing.
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2.
St˜ ⊆ S′t˜
S′
t˜
\St˜ ⊆ CM
(
R, t˜− 1) or equivalently, U
′
t˜
⊆ Ut˜
Ut˜\U ′t˜ ⊆ CM
(
R, t˜− 1) ,
3. for each j ∈ Nt˜\CM
(
R, t˜
)
, pt˜ (j) = p
′
t˜
(j), and
4. for each j ∈ Nt˜\CM
(
R, t˜
)
, ht˜+1 (j) = h
′
t˜+1
(j).
Proof. Consider t˜ = t′. By Claim 4, Nt˜ = N
′
t˜
, Ot˜ = O
′
t˜
and ht˜ = h
′
t˜
. So, (1) holds for step t˜.
An agent in Nt˜\M is satisfied at step t˜ under R if and only if she is satisfied at step t˜ under
R′ because ht˜ = h
′
t˜
and R′j = Rj for all j ∈ N\M . Moreover, each agent in M is unsatisfied at
step t˜ under R because t˜ < t. So, St˜ ⊆ S′t˜. If each agent in M is unsatisfied at step t˜ under R′, we
have St˜ = S
′
t˜
. Now suppose some agent j ∈M is satisfied at step t˜ under R′. Then, j ∈ S′
t˜
\St˜. By
construction, j ∈ CM
(
R, t˜− 1). So, (2) holds at step t˜.
Since Nt˜ = N
′
t˜
, Ot˜ = O
′
t˜
and ht˜ = h
′
t˜
, the graphs at step t˜ under R and R′ differ only in
outgoing edges of agents in M . Then, by comprehensive independence of agents, pt˜ (j) = p
′
t˜
(j) for
all j ∈ Nt˜\M . So, (3) holds at step t˜.
By (3), we know that for each j ∈ Nt˜\CM
(
R, t˜
)
, pt˜ (j) = p
′
t˜
(j). So, any trading cycles consisting
only of agents in Nt˜\CM
(
R, t˜
)
at step t˜, occur under both R and R′. So, ht˜+1 (j) = h
′
t˜+1
(j) and
hence, (4) holds at step t˜.
Now, suppose that the claim holds for some t˜ such that t′ ≤ t˜ < t − 1. We want to show that
the claim is true for step t˜ + 1. Note that any cycle that occurs at step t˜ under R must consist
entirely of agents in Nt˜\CM
(
R, t˜
)
and these cycles occur at step t˜ under R′ as well. Moreover, any
cycle that occurs under R′ but not under R, at step t˜, must consist entirely of agents in CM
(
R, t˜
)
.
This implies (1) and (2) at step t˜+ 1.
Next, we want to show that (3) is true at step t˜ + 1. By Claim 4 and induction hypothesis,
conditions of consistent pointing are satisfied for all t¨ < t˜ + 1. Since t˜ + 1 < t, we have pt˜+1 (j) =
p′
t˜+1
(j) for all j ∈ Nt˜+1\CM
(
R, t˜+ 1
)
by consistent pointing.
By (4) at step t˜ and (3) at step t˜+ 1, we have ht˜+2 (j) = h
′
t˜+2
(j) for all j ∈ Nt˜+1\CM
(
R, t˜+ 1
)
so that (4) holds at step t˜+ 1. 
Remark 2.1. Claim 5 holds at step t till an agent in M departs or becomes satisfied at step t
under R.
Claim 6. It cannot be the case that t′ < t.
Proof. On contrary, suppose that t′ < t. Note that if any agent i ∈ M departs at step t˜,
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under R′, such that t˜ < t7, then α′ (i) ∈ ht−1 (CM (R, t− 1)). This is the case because for any step
t¨ < t, if j ∈ CM
(
R, t¨
)
, then h′
t¨+1
(j) ∈ ht¨
(
CM
(
R, t¨
))
. So, α′ (i) ∈ ht˜−1
(
CM
(
R, t˜− 1)) and, by
persistence, ht˜−1
(
CM
(
R, t˜− 1)) ⊆ ht−1 (CM (R, t− 1)).
By definition, at least one agent in M departs, becomes satisfied or becomes part of a trading
cycle at step t under R. Let i ∈M be the first agent to depart or become satisfied at step t under R.
Let Ni,t ⊆ Nt−1 and Oi,t ⊆ Ot−1 be set of agents and objects, respectively, departing before agent i
departs or becomes satisfied at step t under R. Then, by persistence, Ni,t ∩ CM (R, t− 1) = φ
and Oi,t ∩ ht−1 (CM (R, t− 1)) = φ. If agent i departed at some step t˜ < t under R′, then
α′ (i) ∈ ht−1 (CM (R, t− 1)). Since ht−1 (CM (R, t− 1)) ⊆ Ot−1\Oi,t, α (i)Riα′ (i). Now, suppose
agent i departs at some step t˜ ≥ t under R′. Note that, by Remark 2.1, Ni,t and Oi,t depart at step
t under R′ as well. Moreover, if any agents and objects depart with (or before) Ni,t and Oi,t under
R′, then those agents and objects must be in CM (R, t− 1) and ht (CM (R, t− 1)), respectively.
However, by persistence, ht (CM (R, t− 1)) ⊆ Ot−1\Oi,t and so, α (i)Riα′ (i)8.
Now, suppose that no agent in M departs or becomes satisfied at step t under R. Let i ∈ M
be an agent who becomes part of a trading cycle at step t under R. So, we have α (i) ∈ τ (Ri, Ot).
If agent i departs at some step t˜ < t under R′, then α′ (i) ∈ ht−1 (CM (R, t− 1)). By persistence,
ht−1 (CM (R, t− 1)) ⊆ Ot and so, α (i)Riα′ (i). Now, suppose agent i departs at step t under R′.
Then, α′ (i) ∈ ht−1 (CM (R, t− 1)) and so, α (i)Riα′ (i). Now, suppose that agent i departs at some
step t˜ > t under R′. We have O′
t˜−1 ⊆ Ot because O′t ⊆ Ot by Remark 2.1. Then, α (i)Riα′ (i). 
Claim 7. It cannot be the case that t ≤ t′.
Proof. On contrary, suppose that t ≤ t′. Consider the following cases:
Case 1. No agent in M departs at step t under R.
Then, we have Nt = N ′t and Ot = O
′
t because ht = h
′
t and R
′
i = Ri for each i ∈ N\M . By
definition of t and assumption, there is at least one agent in M who either becomes satisfied or
becomes part of a trading cycle at step t under R.
Let i ∈ M be the first agent to become satisfied at step t under R i.e. after departure of some
agents, agent i is holding one of her most preferred objects and so, α (i) Iiω (i). However, by Claim
4, Nt = N ′t and Ot = O
′
t. Then, for each a ∈ Ot, we have α (i)Ria so that it must be the case that
α (i)Riα
′ (i).
7By Claim 1, t′ < t˜.
8If agent i departs with (or before) Ni,t at step t under R
′, then α′ (i) ∈ ht (CM (R, t− 1)). If agent i departs at
some step t˜ > t under R′, then O′
t˜
⊆ Ot−1\Oi,t.
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Now, let i ∈ M be an agent who becomes part of a trading cycle at step t under R. Then,
α (i) ∈ τ (Ri, Ot). Suppose agent i first becomes part of a trading cycle at step t′i under R′. Then,
t ≤ t′i and so, O′t′i ⊆ Ot
9. Since α′ (i) ∈ τ
(
R′i, O
′
t′i
)
and O′t′i ⊆ Ot, we have α (i)Riα
′ (i).
Case 2. Some agents in M depart at step t under R.
Let i ∈M be the first agent in M to depart at step t under R. Since no agent in M was part of
a trading cycle at step t− 1 under R, we have α (i) = ω (i). Let Ni,t and Oi,t be the set of agents
and objects departing before agent i at step t under R, respectively. Then, Ni,t and Oi,t depart
at step t under R′ as well. Then, α′ (i) ∈ Ot\Oi,t because by Claim 4, ht (Ni,t) = h′t (Ni,t). Then,
α (i)Riα
′ (i) by departure condition. 
Claims (6) and (7) give a contradiction. This completes the proof. 
So, Proposition 2.2 gives a sufficient condition for a rule to satisfy weak group strategy proofness.
Next, I show that TTAS rule is weakly group strategy proof. I prove this by showing that TTAS
satisfies comprehensive independence of agents and consistent pointing.
Proposition 2.3. Top Trading Absorbing Sets Rule (TTAS) satisfies weak group strategy
proofness.
Proof. We know that TTAS satisfies persistence and individual rationality. At any step of
TTAS, unique pointee of an agent is determined by priority ordering of objects and number of
times an object was previously held by that agent. So, TTAS satisfies comprehensive independence
of agents as well.
Now, we need to show that TTAS satisfies consistent pointing. Consider any R ∈ RN and let
R′ = (R−M , R′M ) for some M ⊆ N . Suppose t′ < t. By Claim 4, we have Nt˜ = N ′t˜ , Ot˜ = O′t˜,
ht˜ = h
′
t˜
and for j ∈ Nt˜\M , pt˜ (j) = p′t˜ (j) for all t˜ ≤ t′10. So, TTAS satisfies consistent pointing
for t˜ ≤ t′.
Now, suppose that TTAS satisfies consistent pointing property for some t˜ such that t′ ≤ t˜ < t−1.
We want to show that TTAS satisfies the property for step t˜+ 1. So, for all t¨ ≤ t˜, we have:
1.
N ′
t¨
⊆ Nt¨
Nt¨\N ′t¨ ⊆ CM
(
R, t¨− 1) and O
′
t¨
⊆ Ot¨
Ot¨\O′t¨ ⊆ ht¨
(
CM
(
R, t¨− 1)) ,
2. for all j ∈ Nt¨\CM
(
R, t¨
)
, pt¨ (j) = p
′
t¨
(j), and
3. for all j ∈ Nt¨\CM
(
R, t¨
)
, ht¨+1 (j) = h
′
t¨+1
(j).
9This is the case because, by Claim 4, Ot = O′t and O′t′i
⊆ O′t.
10This is the case because Claim 4 does not require consistent pointing to be true.
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Suppose thatN ′
t˜+1
⊆ Nt˜+1, Nt˜+1\N ′t˜+1 ⊆ CM
(
R, t˜
)
, O′
t˜+1
⊆ Ot˜+1, andOt˜+1\O′t˜+1 ⊆ ht˜
(
CM
(
R, t˜
))
.
Consider any j ∈ Nt˜+1\CM
(
R, t˜+ 1
)
. We need to show that pt˜+1 (j) = p
′
t˜+1
(j). In order to do
that, we first show that for each a ∈ τ (Rj , Ot˜+1) and b ∈ τ (Rj , O′t˜+1), aIjb. Then, we show that
τ
(
Rj , O
′
t˜+1
)
⊆ τ (Rj , Ot˜+1).
First, note that aRjb because O′t˜+1 ⊆ Ot˜+1. Now, if aPjb, then it must be the case that
τ
(
Rj , Ot˜+1
) ∩ O′
t˜+1
= φ. But then, τ
(
Rj , Ot˜+1
) ⊆ ht˜+1 (CM (R, t˜)) because Ot˜+1\O′t˜+1 ⊆
ht˜+1
(
CM
(
R, t˜
))
. So, at step t˜ + 1 under R, agent j points at some agent holding an object
in τ
(
Rj , Ot˜+1
)
but then, j ∈ CM
(
R, t˜+ 1
)
because each agent who owns an object in τ
(
Rj , Ot˜+1
)
is in CM
(
R, t˜+ 1
)
. So, aIjb for each a ∈ τ
(
Rj , Ot˜+1
)
and b ∈ τ
(
Rj , O
′
t˜+1
)
. Hence, it must be the
case that τ
(
Rj , O
′
t˜+1
)
⊆ τ (Rj , Ot˜+1) because O′t˜+1 ⊆ Ot˜+1.
By persistence, j ∈ Nt¨\CM
(
R, t¨
)
for all t¨ ≤ t˜ + 1 and so, same cycles occur for agent j for
all steps t¨ ≤ t˜ under R and R′. Since same cycles occurred for agent j for all t¨ ≤ t˜, objects in
τ
(
Rj , O
′
t˜+1
)
would have been assigned same number of times under R and R′. Let a ∈ τ
(
Rj , O
′
t˜+1
)
be the object that is assigned least number of times11 to agent j. Then, under R′, agent j points
at the agent who owns object a at step t˜+ 1. Under R, it cannot be the case that agent j points at
an agent holding an object in Ot˜+1\O′t˜+1 because Ot˜+1\O′t˜+1 ⊆ ht˜
(
CM
(
R, t˜
))
. So, agent j points
at an agent holding object a at step t˜+ 1 under R. Let pt˜+1 (j) = k and p
′
t˜+1
(j) = k′ under R and
R′. Since j ∈ Nt˜+1\CM
(
R, t˜+ 1
)
, it must be the case that k, k′ ∈ Nt˜+1\CM
(
R, t˜+ 1
)
. Then, by
persistence, k, k′ ∈ Nt˜\CM
(
R, t˜
)
and so, ht˜+1 (k) = h
′
t˜+1
(k) and ht˜+1 (k
′) = h′
t˜+1
(k′). Then, we
have k = k′ and so, pt˜+1 (j) = p
′
t˜+1
(j) which completes the proof. 
Based on Proposition 2.1, Proposition 2.3 and results already proved for TTAS rule, following
theorem can be stated.
Theorem 2.1. For a housing market problem with weak preferences, there are rules which
are Pareto efficient, weak core selecting (hence, individually rational), weakly group strategy proof
(hence, strategy proof ), core selecting (whenever, core is non-empty) and satisfy no justified-envy
for agents with identical endowments.
The sufficient condition given in Proposition 2.2 might be too restrictive especially because rules
satisfying comprehensive independence of agents might be computationally complex which is true
for TTAS rule. This complexity in running time might arise because a rule satisfying comprehensive
independence of agents cannot ensure that each trading cycle consists of at least one unsatisfied
11If there are multiple such objects, ties are broken according to priority ordering of objects.
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agent. So, I provide an alternative sufficient condition for weak group strategy proofness. Consider
the following variation of consistent pointing :
Consistent∗ Pointing: For anyM ⊆ N and R,R′ ∈ RN such that R′ = (R−M , R′M ). Suppose
there is step t˜ for rule ϕ under preferences R and R′ such that:
1. ∀j ∈ Nt˜−1\CM
(
R, t˜− 1), ht˜ (j) = h′t˜ (j),
2.
N ′
t˜
⊆ Nt˜
Nt˜\N ′t˜ ⊆ CM
(
R, t˜− 1) and O
′
t˜
⊆ Ot˜
Ot˜\O′t˜ ⊆ ht˜
(
CM
(
R, t˜− 1)) , and
3.
St˜ ⊆ S′t˜
S′
t˜
\St˜ ⊆ CM
(
R, t˜− 1) or equivalently, U
′
t˜
⊆ Ut˜
Ut˜\U ′t˜ ⊆ CM
(
R, t˜− 1) , then
rule ϕ is said to satisfy consistent∗ pointing if for all j ∈ Nt˜\CM
(
R, t˜
)
, pt˜ (j) = p
′
t˜
(j).
The next result shows that an individually rational rule satisfying independence of unsatisfied
agents, persistence and consistent∗ pointing satisfies weak group strategy proofness.
Proposition 2.4. An individually rational rule satisfying independence of unsatisfied agents,
persistence and consistent∗ pointing satisfies weak group strategy proofness.
Proof. On contrary, suppose there isM ⊆ N and R′M ∈ RM such that ϕ (R′, ω) (i)Piϕ (R,ω) (i)
for all i ∈M where R′ = (R−M , R′M ). Let α ≡ ϕ (R,ω) and α′ ≡ ϕ (R′, ω). Let t (resp. t′) be the
first step in ϕ under R (resp. R′) where either of the following is true for some agent i ∈M :
1. i departs at step t (resp. t′) under R (resp. R′),
2. i becomes satisfied at step t (resp. t′) under R (resp. R′), or
3. i becomes part of a trading cycle at step t (resp. t′) under R (resp. R′).
I prove this result by showing that claims made in proof of Proposition 2.2 are true under these
properties as well. Note that Claims 1-3 hold for rule ϕ. Now I show that Claim 4 is true when
comprehensive independence of agents is replaced with independence of unsatisfied agents.
Claim 4. Nt˜ = N
′
t˜
, Ot˜ = O
′
t˜
, ht˜ = h
′
t˜
and for j ∈ Nt˜\M , pt˜ (j) = p′t˜ (j) for all t˜ < t = min {t, t′}.
Moreover, ht = h′t. Also, if no agent in M departs at step t under R, Nt = N
′
t and Ot = O
′
t.
Proof. If t = 1, the claim holds vacuously. Now suppose that t > 1. Consider t˜ = 1. No agent in
M departs at step 1 under either R or R′ (Claims 1-2). Then, set of departing agents and objects
should be the same because R′j = Rj for all j ∈ N\M . So, N1 = N ′1 and O1 = O′1. Moreover, each
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agent holds her endowment at step 1 so that h1 = h′1. Since each agent inM is unsatisfied at step 1
under R and R′, by independence of unsatisfied agents, we have p1 (j) = p′1 (j) for each j ∈ N1\M .
Now, suppose claim is true for some t˜ < t− 1. We want to show that the claim is true for t˜+ 1.
By induction hypothesis, we have Nt˜ = N
′
t˜
, Ot˜ = O
′
t˜
, ht˜ = h
′
t˜
and pt˜ (j) = p
′
t˜
(j) for each j ∈ Nt˜\M .
Since t˜ < t, no agent in M is part of a trading cycle under either R or R′ at step t˜. So, same
cycles occur under both R and R′ because pt˜ (j) = p
′
t˜
(j) for each j ∈ Nt˜\M . Hence, ht˜+1 = h′t˜+1.
Since t˜ + 1 < t, no agent in M departs at step t˜ + 1 under either R or R′. So, Nt˜+1 = N
′
t˜+1
and
Ot˜+1 = O
′
t˜+1
because ht˜+1 = h
′
t˜+1
and R′j = Rj for all j ∈ N\M . Moreover, since no agent in M is
satisfied at step t˜+1 under either R or R′, by independence of unsatisfied agents, pt˜+1 (j) = p
′
t˜+1
(j)
for all j ∈ Nt˜+1\M .
To show that ht = h′t, we simply need to show that ht˜+2 = h
′
t˜+2
. Since t˜ + 1 < t, no agent in
M is part of a trading cycle at step t˜ + 1 under R and R′. Then, same cycles occur under R and
R′ at step t˜+ 1 because pt˜+1 (j) = p
′
t˜+1
(j) for all j ∈ Nt˜+1\M and so, we have ht˜+2 = h′t˜+2.
Now we show that last part of the claim holds true. Since ht = h′t and no agent in M departs
at step t under either R (by assumption) or R′ (Claim 1), same agents depart at step t under R
and R′ because R′j = Rj for all j ∈ N\M . Hence, Nt = N ′t and Ot = O′t. 
Claim 5. Suppose t′ < t. For any step t˜ and R ∈ RN , let CM
(
R, t˜
)
= ∪i∈MCi
(
R, t˜
)
. Then,
for all t˜ ∈ {t′, · · · , t− 1}:
1.
N ′
t˜
⊆ Nt˜
Nt˜\N ′t˜ ⊆ CM
(
R, t˜− 1) and O
′
t˜
⊆ Ot˜
Ot˜\O′t˜ ⊆ ht˜
(
CM
(
R, t˜− 1)) ,
2.
St˜ ⊆ S′t˜
S′
t˜
\St˜ ⊆ CM
(
R, t˜− 1) or equivalently, U
′
t˜
⊆ Ut˜
Ut˜\U ′t˜ ⊆ CM
(
R, t˜− 1) ,
3. for each j ∈ Nt˜\CM
(
R, t˜
)
, pt˜ (j) = p
′
t˜
(j), and
4. for each j ∈ Nt˜\CM
(
R, t˜
)
, ht˜+1 (j) = h
′
t˜+1
(j).
Proof. Consider t˜ = t′. By Claim 4, Nt˜ = N
′
t˜
, Ot˜ = O
′
t˜
and ht˜ = h
′
t˜
. So, (1) holds for step t˜.
An agent in Nt˜\M is satisfied at step t˜ under R if and only if she is satisfied at step t˜ under R′
because ht˜ = h
′
t˜
, R′j = Rj for all j ∈ N\M and Ot˜ = O′t˜. Moreover, each agent in M is unsatisfied
at step t˜ under R because t˜ < t. So, St˜ ⊆ S′t˜. If each agent in M is unsatisfied at step t˜ under R′,
we have St˜ = S
′
t˜
. Now, suppose some agent j ∈M is satisfied at step t˜ under R′. Then, j ∈ S′
t˜
\St˜.
By construction, j ∈ CM
(
R, t˜− 1). So, (2) holds at step t˜.
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Since ht˜ = h
′
t˜
(by Claim 4), (1) and (2) hold at step t˜ and the rule satisfies consistent∗ pointing,
we have pt˜ (j) = p
′
t˜
(j) for all j ∈ Nt˜\CM
(
R, t˜
)
i.e. (3) holds at step t˜.
By (3), we know that for each j ∈ Nt˜\CM
(
R, t˜
)
, pt˜ (j) = p
′
t˜
(j). So, any trading cycles consisting
only of agents in Nt˜\CM
(
R, t˜
)
at step t˜, occur under both R and R′. So, ht˜+1 (j) = h
′
t˜+1
(j) and
hence, (4) holds at step t˜.
Now, suppose that the claim holds for some t˜ such that t′ ≤ t˜ < t − 1. We want to show that
it is true for step t˜ + 1. Note that any cycle that occurs at step t˜ under R must consist entirely
of agents in Nt˜\CM
(
R, t˜
)
and these cycles occur at step t˜ under R′ as well. Moreover, any cycle
that occurs under R′ but not under R, at step t˜, must consist entirely of agents in CM
(
R, t˜
)
. This
implies (1) and (2) at step t˜+ 1.
Next, we want to show that (3) is true at step t˜ + 1. Since (4) holds at step t˜, (1) and (2) are
satisfied at step t˜+ 1 and the rule satisfies consistent∗ pointing, we have pt˜+1 (j) = p
′
t˜+1
(j) for all
j ∈ Nt˜+1\CM
(
R, t˜+ 1
)
.
By (4) at step t˜ and (3) at step t˜+ 1, we have ht˜+2 (j) = h
′
t˜+2
(j) for all j ∈ Nt˜+1\CM
(
R, t˜+ 1
)
so that (4) holds at step t˜+ 1. 
Claim 6. It cannot be the case that t′ < t.
Proof. On contrary, suppose that t′ < t. Note that if any agent i ∈M departs at step t˜, under
R′, such that t˜ < t12, then α′ (i) ∈ ht−1 (CM (R, t− 1)). This is the case because for any step
t¨ < t, if j ∈ CM
(
R, t¨
)
, then h′
t¨+1
(j) ∈ ht¨
(
CM
(
R, t¨
))
. So, α′ (i) ∈ ht˜−1
(
CM
(
R, t˜− 1)) and, by
persistence, ht˜−1
(
CM
(
R, t˜− 1)) ⊆ ht−1 (CM (R, t− 1)).
By definition, at least one agent in M departs, becomes satisfied or becomes part of a trading
cycle at step t under R. Let i ∈M be the first agent to depart or become satisfied at step t under R.
Let Ni,t ⊆ Nt−1 and Oi,t ⊆ Ot−1 be set of agents and objects, respectively, departing before agent i
at step t under R. Then, by persistence, Ni,t ∩CM (R, t− 1) = φ and Oi,t ∩ ht−1 (CM (R, t− 1)) =
φ. If agent i departed at some step t˜ < t under R′, then α′ (i) ∈ ht−1 (CM (R, t− 1)). Since
ht−1 (CM (R, t− 1)) ⊆ Ot−1\Oi,t, α (i)Riα′ (i). Now, suppose agent i departs at some step t˜ ≥ t
under R′. Note that, by Remark 2.1, Ni,t and Oi,t depart at step t under R′ as well. Moreover,
if any agents and objects depart with (or before) Ni,t and Oi,t under R′, then those agents and
objects must be in CM (R, t− 1) and ht (CM (R, t− 1)), respectively. However, by persistence,
12By Claim 1, t′ < t˜.
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ht (CM (R, t− 1)) ⊆ Ot−1\Oi,t and so, α (i)Riα′ (i)13.
Now, suppose that no agent in M departs or becomes satisfied at step t under R. Let i ∈ M
be an agent who becomes part of a trading cycle at step t under R. So, we have α (i) ∈ τ (Ri, Ot).
If agent i departs at some step t˜ < t under R′, then α′ (i) ∈ ht−1 (CM (R, t− 1)). By persistence,
ht−1 (CM (R, t− 1)) ⊆ Ot and so, α (i)Riα′ (i). Now, suppose agent i departs at step t under R′.
Then, α′ (i) ∈ ht−1 (CM (R, t− 1)) and so, α (i)Riα′ (i). Now suppose that agent i departs at some
step t˜ > t under R′. We have O′
t˜−1 ⊆ Ot because O′t ⊆ Ot by Remark 2.1. Then, α (i)Riα′ (i). 
Claim 7. It cannot be the case that t ≤ t′.
Proof. On contrary, suppose that t ≤ t′. Consider the following cases:
Case 1. No agent in M departs at step t under R.
Then, we have Nt = N ′t and Ot = O
′
t because ht = h
′
t and R
′
i = Ri for each i ∈ N\M . By
definition of t and assumption, there is at least one agent in M who either becomes satisfied or
becomes part of a trading cycle at step t under R.
Let i ∈ M be the first agent to become satisfied at step t under R i.e. after departure of some
agents, agent i is holding one of her most preferred objects and so, α (i) Iiω (i). However, by Claim
4, Nt = N ′t and Ot = O
′
t. Then, for each a ∈ Ot, we have α (i)Ria so that it must be the case that
α (i)Riα
′ (i).
Now, let i ∈ M be an agent who becomes part of a trading cycle at step t under R. Then,
α (i) ∈ τ (Ri, Ot). Suppose agent i first becomes part of a trading cycle at step t′i under R′. Then,
t ≤ t′i and so, O′t′i ⊆ Ot
14. Since α′ (i) ∈ τ
(
R′i, O
′
t′i
)
and O′t′i ⊆ Ot, we have α (i)Riα
′ (i).
Case 2. Some agents in M depart at step t under R.
Let i ∈M be the first agent in M to depart at step t under R. Since no agent in M was part of
a trading cycle at step t− 1 under R, we have α (i) = ω (i). Let Ni,t and Oi,t be the set of agents
and objects departing before agent i at step t under R, respectively. Then, Ni,t and Oi,t depart at
step t under R′ as well. Then, α′ (i) ∈ Ot\Oi,t because by Claim 4, ht (Ni,t) = h′t (Ni,t) and agent
i does not depart at step t under R′. Then, α (i)Riα′ (i) by departure condition. 
Claims (6) and (7) give us a contradiction. This completes the proof. 
13If agent i departs with (or before) Ni,t at step t under R
′, then α′ (i) ∈ ht (CM (R, t− 1)). If agent i departs at
some step t˜ > t, then O′
t˜
⊆ Ot−1\Oi,t.
14This is the case because, by Claim 4, Ot = O′t and O′t′i
⊆ O′t.
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Prioritized Treatment of Market-Equal Unsatisfied Agents
I resume the use of notation with ϕ in super-script. In this section, I propose a new crite-
rion; namely, prioritized treatment of market-equal unsatisfied agents. Before defining this property
formally, I provide some intuition for this property using an example.
Example 2.1: Consider the following housing market problem: N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, O = {a, b, c, d, e},
ω = (a, b, c, d, e) and preference profile:
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
bcd ab a a a
a
... ce d e
e
...
...
...
In this problem, Pareto efficient and individually rational assignments are: (c, b, a, d, e), (d, b, c, a, e)
and (c, b, e, d, a). In each of these assignments, exactly one agent in {3, 4, 5} gets her unique most
preferred object a. Which of these assignments should be outcome of the housing market problem
though? As mentioned earlier, social ranking of agents can arise in real-life applications of the
housing market problem. So, a potential solution could be to select whoever has highest priority
among agents 3, 4 and 5 to receive object a. However, note that no rule employing trading cycles
can ever select the outcome (c, b, e, d, a) because agents 1 and 2 find object e to be worse than
their endowments and agents 3 and 4 cannot trade with agent 5 until object a has been removed
from the problem. On the other hand, agents 1, 2, 3 and 4 would want to trade with each other
because there is a potential for beneficial trades i.e. for each agent i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, there is an agent
j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} such that agent j holds one of agent i's most preferred object (among the remaining
ones) and all most preferred objects (among the remaining ones) of agent i are held by agents in
{1, 2, 3, 4}. I refer to such agents as market-equals. Then, by definition, agents in an absorbing set
of a graph are market-equals. So, at any step of rule ϕ, I refer to agents in the same absorbing
set as market-equals. Satisfied (resp. unsatisfied) agents in this absorbing set are referred to as
market-equal satisfied (resp. unsatisfied) agents.
Note that object a is one of the most preferred objects for agent 2 as well. However, agent 2
already holds one of her most preferred objects in the problem. Existing rules ensure that an agent's
welfare does not decrease throughout the algorithm, so it would make sense to prioritize treatment
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of market-equal agent who does not hold one of her most preferred objects (among the remaining
ones). Hence, for this criterion, I consider only market-equal unsatisfied agents. So, it might be of
interest to require that among market-equals, highest priority unsatisfied agent receives one of her
most preferred objects (among the remaining ones). However, if strategy proofness is required, it
might not always be possible to achieve this. So, in defining prioritized treatment of market-equal
unsatisfied agents, independence of unsatisfied agents and persistence need to be considered.
Consequences of persistence are straightforward. By enforcing persistence, certain trading cycles
might not be achievable because unique pointees for some agents are determined from the previous
step. So, only those paths in an absorbing set can be considered which do not violate persistence.
Consequences of independence of unsatisfied agents are slightly more complicated. This condition
requires that unique pointee of each agent are determined independent of preferences of other un-
satisfied agents. Consider an absorbing set. Suppose agent i1 is the highest priority unsatisfied
agent in this absorbing set. Additionally, suppose that for each cycle containing agent i1 in this
absorbing set, there are at least three unsatisfied agents (including agent i1). However, by indepen-
dence of unsatisfied agents, it cannot be ensured that a cycle consisting of agent i1 occurs at that
step. Suppose the cycle has unsatisfied agents i1, i2 and i3 such that there is a path from agent
i1 to agent i2, path from agent i2 to agent i3 and path from agent i3 to agent i1. Then, a rule
satisfying independence of unsatisfied agents cannot ensure that path from agent i2 to i3 occurs via
pointing.
So, I define the following condition which ensures that independence of unsatisfied agents and
persistence do not interfere with assigning the highest priority market-equal unsatisfied agent her
most preferred object (among the remaining ones):
Strategy proofness compliance: At any step of a rule ϕ, an absorbing set satisfies strategy
proofness compliance if there is at least one cycle such that:
1. each agent in the cycle is either not pointing based on persistence or is pointing at the same
agent/object as in the cycle, and
2. there are at most two unsatisfied agents in the cycle who have a higher priority than every
other unsatisfied agent in the absorbing set.
Now, prioritized treatment of market-equal unsatisfied agents can be defined as follows:
Prioritized Treatment of Market-Equal Unsatisfied Agents: A rule ϕ satisfies prioritized
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treatment of market-equal unsatisfied agents if, at any step of the rule, whenever an absorbing set
satisfies strategy proofness compliance, the highest priority unsatisfied agent in the absorbing set
receives one of her most preferred objects (among the remaining ones).
Now that this new criterion has been defined, it would be of interest to determine if some existing
rules satisfy this property. The next result shows that TC, TTAS and HPO rules do not satisfy
prioritized treatment of market-equal unsatisfied agents when priority orderings required for these
rules is based on social ranking of agents.
Proposition 2.5. TC, TTAS and HPO rules do not satisfy prioritized treatment of market-
equal unsatisfied agents.
Proof. Consider the following housing market problem: N = {1, 2, · · · , 8}, O = {a, b, · · · , h},
ω = (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h), priority ordering 1 ≺ · · · ≺ 8 (a ≺ · · · ≺ h for TTAS and HPO) and
preference profile:
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8
d d ac defg eh cf bg d
a b
...
...
...
...
... h
...
...
...
Note that in this housing market problem, all agents are market-equals and it satisfies strat-
egy proofness compliance because in the first step of ϕ ∈ {TC, TTAS,HPO} persistence does
not play any role and agent 1 is the highest priority unsatisfied agent according to the priority
orderings. Now, consider outcomes of TC, TTAS and HPO: TC≺ (R,ω) = (a, d, c, g, e, f, b, h)
and TTAS≺ (R,ω) = HPO≺ (R,ω) = (a, b, c, e, h, f, g, d). So, agent 1 does not receive her most
preferred object. 
Note that for TC rule, no priority orderings can be found where agent 1 gets object d in
counter-example of Proposition 2.5 because for any priority ordering, agent 4 points at either agent
5 or agent 7. Arguably, for TTAS and HPO rules, for a given housing market problem, it might
be possible to find priority orderings such that agent 1 receives object d. However, this would
require determining priority orderings for each housing market problem so that these rules satisfy
prioritized treatment of market-equal unsatisfied agents. In the next section, I propose a rule which
satisfies prioritized treatment of market-equal unsatisfied agents when priority ordering reflects social
ranking of agents i.e. there is no need to determine priority orderings in order to satisfy prioritized
treatment of market-equal unsatisfied agents. Additionally, I show that this rule satisfies several
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desirable properties.
Modified Top Cycles Rule
Here, I present a new rule; namely Modified Top Cycles (MTC) rule. However, I drop MTC
in the super-script since I discuss only MTC from here on. The goal of proposing this rule is to
achieve prioritized treatment of market-equal unsatisfied agents along with other desirable results.
In this and the following section, I assume that there are no indifferences with endowments. Let
this class of preferences be represented as R¯. Then, for any (R,ω) ∈ R¯N × A, i ∈ N and a ∈ O,
aIiωi implies that a = ωi15. Also, priority ordering over agents ≺ is used for MTC.
Like all the rules discussed in this chapter, each step ofMTC proceeds in three phases; departure,
pointing and trading. Step t of the algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. Agents satisfying departure condition are chosen to depart until no more agents satisfy the
departure condition. Each departing agent is assigned the object she is holding at that step
i.e. if agent i was chosen to depart, then agent i is assigned ht (i).
2. Each agent points at an agent holding one of her most preferred objects (among the remaining
ones). If there are more than one such people, the unique pointee is determined in the following
manner:
(a) (Persistence) For any i ∈ Ut, if there are {i1, · · · , im} ⊆ Nt−1 such that pt−1 (ir) = ir+1
for all r ∈ {1, · · · ,m− 1} and pt−1 (im) = i, then pt (ir) = ir+1 for all r ∈ {1, · · · ,m− 1}
and pt (im) = i.
(b) Here we determine a unique pointee for each agent in St who is not pointing as yet.
Repeat the following until all agents in Ut have been considered16:
i. Let j ∈ Ut be the highest priority unsatisfied agent who has not been considered
yet. For any i ∈ St who is not pointing yet and ht (j) ∈ τ (Ri, Ot), agent i points at
agent j i.e. pt (i) = j. If there is no such agent, move on to the next highest priority
unsatisfied agent who has not been considered yet, otherwise move to (ii).
15The reasoning behind this assumption will become apparent in the next chapter.
16Note that after (b), each satisfied agent must be pointing due to the departure condition.
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ii. For each i ∈ St, let X (i) denote the first unsatisfied agent that can be reached by
following pointing of agent i i.e. i points at X (i), i points at a satisfied agent who
points at X (i), i points at a satisfied agent who points at a satisfied agent who
points at X (i) and so on. For any k ∈ St who is not pointing yet, if there is an
i ∈ St such that X (i) = j and ht (i) ∈ τ (Rk, Ot), then agent k points at agent i.
If there are more than one such agents, agent k points at agent i who has higher
priority under ≺ and X (i) = j. Repeat until each agent k ∈ St, who is not pointing
yet, any satisfied agent i who holds one of her most preferred objects (among the
remaining ones), X (i) 6= j or X (i) is not defined. Return to (i).
(c) Now we determine a unique agent to point at for any agent in Ut who is not pointing as
yet. For each j ∈ Ut, let X (j) = j. Consider any i ∈ Ut who is not pointing yet. Agent
i points at whoever holds one of her most preferred objects and has a higher priority
unsatisfied agent reachable under X. If there are multiple such agents, agent i points at
whoever among these agents has a higher priority. Formally, let K ⊆ Nt be such that for
each k ∈ K, ht (k) ∈ τ (Ri,Ot). Let J ⊆ K be such that for each j ∈ J , X (j) ≺ X (k)
where k ∈ K\J and for each j, j′ ∈ J , X (j) = X (j′). Agent i points at whoever has
highest priority in J under ≺ i.e. pt (i) = j if j ≺ j′ for each j′ ∈ J\ {j}.
3. Since every agent is pointing at another agent, there is at least one cycle of agents in the
problem. In the step next step, each agent in a cycle holds object of the agent she was
pointing at.
For any (R,ω) ∈ R¯N ×A and priority ordering of agents ≺, Modified Top Cycles rule outcome
is denoted as MTC≺ (R,ω). As I show in the next section, MTC satisfies prioritized treatment of
market-equal unsatisfied agents along with several desirable properties.
Results for Modified Top Cycles Rule
In this section, I present results for MTC rule. Proposition 2.6 states that MTC rule is
Pareto efficient, individually rational and weak core selecting. These properties follow directly
from Propositions 3 and 4 of Jaramillo & Manjunath [14] and so, I do not provide a formal proof.
Proposition 2.6. For each priority ordering ≺ and (R,ω) ∈ R¯N ×A, MTC≺ (R,ω) is Pareto
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efficient, individually rational and weak-core selecting.
Next, I establish that MTC is strategy proof i.e. no agent has an incentive to misreport her
preferences. Notice that persistence has been explicitly enforced in algorithm of MTC. Moreover,
MTC satisfies independence of unsatisfied agents. This is the case because every agent, who is not
persistently pointing, points at an agent leading to a path to the highest priority unsatisfied agent
that she can reach and that decision is independent of preferences of unsatisfied agents. Then,
by Theorem 3 of Saban & Sethuraman [27] and Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, presented in Chapter III,
strategy proofness of MTC is equivalent to local invariance which is defined as follows:
Local Invariance: Consider any (R,ω) ∈ R¯N ×A. Suppose some agent i ∈ N receives a ∈ O
such that aPiω (i) under rule ϕ. Let R′i ∈ R¯ be such that R′i|O\{a} = Ri|O\{a} i.e. ordering of
objects in O\ {a} is same under both Ri and R′i. Moreover, bPia ⇐⇒ bP ′ia and aRib ⇐⇒ aP ′i b for
all b ∈ O\ {a}. The rule ϕ is said to satisfy local invariance if ϕ (R′, ω) (i) = a where R′ = (R−i, R′i).
In order to establish local invariance ofMTC, I use some additional notation. Consider R,R′ ∈
R¯N such that R′ = (R−i, R′i), ω ∈ A and some priority ordering ≺ over agents. Let Nt (resp.
N ′t) and Ot (resp. O
′
t) be set of agents and objects remaining after departure phase of step t for
MTC≺ (R,ω) (resp. MTC≺ (R′, ω)), respectively. Let St ⊆ Nt (resp. S′t ⊆ N ′t) and Ut ⊆ Nt (resp.
U ′t ⊆ N ′t) be set of satisfied and unsatisfied agents at step t forMTC≺ (R,ω) (resp. MTC≺ (R,ω)),
respectively. Let ht (j) (resp. h′t (j)) denote object held by agent j at beginning of step t of
MTC≺ (R,ω) (resp. MTC≺ (R′, ω)). For any step t and j ∈ Nt (resp. j ∈ N ′t), let pt (j) (resp.
p′t (j)) represent the agent pointed at by agent j in pointing phase of step t for MTC
≺ (R,ω) (resp.
MTC≺ (R′, ω)). Let Ci (R, t) (resp. Ci (R′, t)) be set of all j ∈ Nt (resp. j ∈ N ′t) such that j = i,
pt (j) = i (resp. p′t (j) = i), pt (pt (j)) = i (resp. p
′
t (p
′
t (j)) = i) and so on under R (resp. R
′).
Now, fix agent i and assume that only agent i is misreporting her preferences. Let t (resp. t′)
be the first step agent i becomes part of a trading cycle or becomes satisfied under MTC≺ (R,ω)
(resp. MTC≺ (R′, ω)). Let t = min {t, t′}. Following result says that state of algorithm is same
before step t regardless of whether agent i reports Ri or R′i.
Lemma 2.1. For all 0 ≤ t˜ < t, Nt˜ = N ′t˜ , Ot˜ = O′t˜ , ht˜ = h′t˜ and for each j ∈ Nt˜\ {i},
pt˜ (j) = p
′
t˜
(j). Moreover, ht = h′t and if i is not satisfied at step t under R and R
′, then Nt = N ′t ,
Ot = O
′
t , and for each j ∈ Nt\ {i}, pt (j) = p′t (j).
Proof. If t = 1, the claim holds vacuously for t˜ = 0. Now suppose t > 1. Then, it must be the
case that i ∈ U1 and i ∈ U ′1. The set of departing agents in step 1 should be the same under R
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and R′ because i does not depart and for each j ∈ N\ {i}, R′j = Rj . So, it must be the case that
N1 = N
′
1 and O1 = O
′
1. Before first step, no trading has taken place so each agent is holding her
endowments i.e. h1 (j) = h′1 (j) = ω (j) for all j ∈ N . Moreover, each j 6= i points at the same
person at step 1 because i is unsatisfied under both R and R′ and MTC satisfies independence of
unsatisfied agents. So, the claim holds for step 1.
Now, suppose the claim holds for some t˜ < t− 1. We need to show that it holds for step t˜+ 1.
By assumption, we have Nt˜ = N
′
t˜
, Ot˜ = O
′
t˜
, ht˜ = h
′
t˜
and for each j ∈ Nt˜\ {i}, pt˜ (j) = p′t˜ (j). Since
t˜ < t, agent i is not part of a trading cycle under R or R′. So, same trading cycles are formed
for both R and R′ at step t˜. Hence, ht˜+1 = h
′
t˜+1
. Moreover, since t˜ + 1 < t, agent i does not
depart in departure phase of step t˜+ 1 under either R or R′. Then, it must be that Nt˜+1 = N
′
t˜+1
and Ot˜+1 = O
′
t˜+1
. Moreover, it must be that for each j ∈ Nt˜+1\ {i}, pt˜+1 (j) = p′t˜+1 (j) because
i ∈ Ut˜+1, i ∈ U ′t˜+1 and MTC satisfies independence of unsatisfied agents.
Now, we prove second part of the lemma. We know that Nt−1 = N ′t−1, Ot−1 = O
′
t−1, ht−1 =
h′t−1 and for each j ∈ Nt−1\ {i}, pt−1 (j) = p′t−1 (j). Agent i is not part of a trading cycle under
R or R′ at step t − 1. So, we have same trading cycles under both R and R′. Hence, ht = h′t. If
agent i is not satisfied under either R or R′ at step t, we have Nt = N ′t and Ot = O
′
t. Also, for
each j ∈ Nt\ {i}, pt (j) = p′t (j) because MTC satisfies independence of unsatisfied agents. This
completes the proof. 
The following result proves that MTC satisfies local invariance for general preferences.
Proposition 2.7. For each priority ordering ≺ and (R,ω) ∈ RN × A, MTC≺ (R,ω) satisfies
local invariance.
Proof. Consider any (R,ω) ∈ RN × A and i ∈ N such that MTC≺ (R,ω) (i) = a such that
aPiω (i). Let R′i ∈ R be such that R′i|O\{a} = Ri|O\{a}, bPia ⇐⇒ bP ′ia and aRib ⇐⇒ aP ′i b for
all b ∈ O\ {a}. Let α ≡ MTC≺ (R,ω) and α′ ≡ MTC≺ (R′, ω). We want to show that α′ (i) = a.
Notice that since α (i)Piω (i), it cannot be the case that agent i becomes satisfied before trading
phase of step t because ht (i) = ω (i).
Note that it must be the case that α (i) ∈ O′t. If not, α (i) would have departed at (or before)
step t under R as well because ht = h′t by Lemma 2.1. This would imply that agent i cannot
receive α (i) under R. Since ht (i) = h′t (i), it cannot be the case that agent i is satisfied at step t
under either R or R′ because we have α (i)P ′iω (i). So, it cannot be the case that agent i departs
in departure phase of step t = min {t, t′} under R or R′. Moreover, it cannot be the case that
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α′ (i) I ′iω (i) since then it cannot be possible for agent i to receive α (i) under R. This is the case
because if t′ ≤ t, then it means that each b ∈ O such that bP ′iω (i) has departed by departure phase
of step t′ under R′ but by construction of R′i, bPiω (i) ⇐⇒ bP ′iω (i), and so agent i cannot receive
α (i) under R. If t < t′, then the trading cycle agent i is part of at step t under R, occurs as a
chain in pointing phase at step t under R′ and keeps on occurring until agent i becomes satisfied by
persistence. In other words, under R′, agent i can always receive ht+1 (i) and since ht+1 (i)Piω (i),
we have ht+1 (i)P ′iω (i). So, agent i cannot become satisfied before trading phase of step t
′ under
R′.
Step 1: α (i)Riα
′ (i). Consider the following cases:
Case 1: t = t ≤ t′.
Since agent i does not depart at step t, by Lemma 2.1, Ot = O′t. Moreover, under R, agent i is
part of a trading cycle at step t. So, α (i) Iiht+1 (i) and ht+1 (i) ∈ τ
(
Ri, Ot
)
. Since O′t′ ⊆ Ot and
α′ (i) ∈ Ot, we have α (i)Riα′ (i).
Case 2: t = t′ < t.
On contrary, suppose that α′ (i)Piα (i). Since agent i does not depart at step t, by Lemma 2.1,
Nt = N
′
t , Ot = O
′
t and ht = h
′
t. Since t = t
′, agent i is part of a trading cycle at step t under R′.
Let the cycle be C = {i1, · · · , im} such that p′t (i1) = i2, p′t (i2) = i3,· · · , p′t (im) = i1. Without loss
of generality, let im = i and so, α′ (i) I ′iht (i1). Since α
′ (i)Piα (i), we have α′ (i) 6= α (i). Then, by
construction of R′i, ht (i1) 6= α (i). So, α′ (i) Iiht (i1).
Note that, by Lemma 2.1, each j ∈ Nt\ {i} points at same agent at step t under R and R′.
So, the trading cycle C occurs as a chain at step t under R i.e. pt (i1) = i2, pt (i2) = i3,· · · ,
pt (im−1) = im and im = i17. Then, by persistence, this chain keeps occurring as long as agent i is
unsatisfied. Agent i remains unsatisfied until trading phase of step t under R. So, this chain occurs
up to step t and we have ht (j) = ht (j) for all j ∈ {i1, · · · , im}. Specifically, ht (i1) ∈ Ot. Since
agent i is part of a trading cycle at step t, α (i) Iiht+1 (i) and ht+1 (i) ∈ τ (Ri, Ot). So, α (i)Riα′ (i)
which is a contradiction.
Step 2: α′ (i)R′iα (i) when t = t
′ ≤ t. Since agent i does not depart at step t, by Lemma 2.1,
Ot = O
′
t. Moreover, under R
′, agent i is part of a trading cycle at step t. So, α′ (i) I ′ih
′
t+1 (i) and
h′t+1 (i) ∈ τ
(
R′i, Ot
)
. Since, Ot ⊆ Ot, α (i) ∈ O′t. This implies that α′ (i)R′iα (i).
Step 3: α′ (i) = α (i) or α′ (i)R′iα (i) when t = t < t
′. In order to prove this, we follow the
17Under R, this is not a cycle because t′ < t.
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approach of Jaramillo & Manjunath [14]. Consider the following claim:
Post-trade Inclusion Claim: Let t < t′ i.e. t = t. Then, for all t¨ ∈ {t, · · · , t′}:
1.
Ot¨ ⊆ O′t¨
O′
t¨
\Ot¨ ⊆ ht¨
(
Ci
(
R′, t¨− 1)) , and Nt¨ ⊆ N
′
t¨
N ′
t¨
\Nt¨ ⊆ Ci
(
R′, t¨− 1) ,
2. S′
t¨
⊆ St¨ and St¨\S′t¨ ⊆ Ci
(
R′, t¨− 1),
3. for each j ∈ N ′
t¨
\Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
, pt¨ (j) = p
′
t¨
(j), and
4. for each j ∈ N ′
t¨
\Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
, ht¨+1 (j) = h
′
t¨+1
(j).
Proof. Consider t¨ = t. Then, by Lemma 2.1; Nt = N ′t , Ot = O
′
t, ht = h
′
t and for each
j ∈ Nt\ {i}, pt (j) = p′t (j). So, (1)− (3) hold for t¨ = t.
Since for each j ∈ Nt\ {i}, we have pt (j) = p′t (j), it must be that Ci (R, t) = Ci (R′, t). So, if
any j ∈ Nt\Ci (R, t) is part of a trading cycle at step t under R, that trading cycle must consist only
of agents in Nt\Ci (R, t) otherwise we would have j ∈ Ci (R, t). Then, for any j ∈ Nt\Ci (R′, t),
same trading cycles occur under both R and R′. Hence, for each j ∈ N ′t\Ci (R′, t), we would have
ht+1 (j) = h
′
t+1 (j) because ht = h
′
t. So, (4) holds for t¨ = t.
Now, suppose (1)− (4) hold for all t¨ < t′ − 1. We want to show that the claim is true for step
t¨ + 1. Note that at step t¨ + 1, no agent in Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
departs under R′ because agent i does not
become satisfied before trading phase of step t′. So, any agents (along with their objects) departing
at step t¨ + 1 under R′ must be in N ′
t¨
\Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
. By induction hypothesis, we know that for any
j ∈ N ′
t¨
\Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
, ht¨+1 (j) = ht¨+1 (j) and Ot¨ ⊆ O′t¨. So, if a group of agents, G ⊆ N ′t¨ departs
at step t¨ + 1 under R′, G ⊆ N ′
t¨
\Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
. Notice that G ⊆ Nt¨ otherwise there is j ∈ G such
that j ∈ Ci
(
R′, t¨− 1) and by persistence, Ci (R′, t¨− 1) ⊆ Ci (R′, t¨) so that j ∈ Ci (R′, t¨). Let
G = G1 ∪ · · · ∪ GT where G1 is the first group to depart, G2 is second group to depart,· · · , GT
is the T -th (and last) group to depart at step t¨ + 1 under R′. Moreover, let Ak = h′t¨+1 (Gk) for
k ∈ {1, · · · , T}. Then, by departure condition, for each j ∈ Gk, h′t¨+1 (j) ∈ τ
(
Rj , O
′
t¨
\ (∪k−1l=1 Al))
and h′
t¨+1
(Gk) = ∪j∈Gkτ
(
Rj , O
′
t¨
\ (∪k−1l=1 Al)) for k ∈ {1, · · · , T}. Then, we have for each j ∈ Gk,
ht¨+1 (j) ∈ τ
(
Rj , Ot¨\
(∪k−1l=1 Al)), and ht¨+1 (Gk) = ∪j∈Gkτ (Rj , Ot¨\ (∪k−1l=1 Al)) for k ∈ {1, · · · , T}
because Ot¨ ⊆ O′t¨ from (1) and ht¨+1 (j) = h′t¨+1 (j) for all j ∈ G from (4). So, any agents, along with
their objects, departing at step t¨+ 1 under R′, depart at step t¨+ 1, along with their objects, under
R as well. So, we have Nt¨+1 ⊆ N ′t¨+1 and Ot¨+1 ⊆ O′t¨+1 because Nt¨ ⊆ N ′t¨ and Ot¨ ⊆ O′t¨.
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Note that for any trading cycle, say C, that occurs at step t¨ under R but not under R′, it must
be the case that C ⊆ Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
by (3) at step t¨. Moreover, any trading cycle that occurs at step
t¨ under R′, also occurs under R because no agent in Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
is part of a trading cycle at step t¨
under R′. Then, it must be the case that S′
t¨+1
⊆ St¨+1 and St¨+1\S′t¨+1 ⊆ Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
because S′
t¨
⊆ St¨,
St¨\S′t¨ ⊆ Ci
(
R′, t¨− 1), any cycle that occurs at step t¨ under R′ also occurs under R and any cycle
that occurs at step t¨ under R but not under R′ must consist entirely of agents in Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
.
Now, we show that N ′
t¨+1
\Nt¨+1 ⊆ Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
. Suppose j ∈ N ′
t¨+1
\Nt¨+1 but j /∈ Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
. Note
that if j ∈ N ′
t¨
, then j ∈ Nt¨ because N ′t¨\Nt¨ ⊆ Ci
(
R′, t¨− 1) and Ci (R′, t¨− 1) ⊆ Ci (R′, t¨) by
persistence. Suppose that j ∈ St¨. It cannot be that j ∈ S′t¨ since then j ∈ S′t¨+1 which contradicts
S′
t¨+1
⊆ St¨+1. So, j /∈ S′t¨. But then, j ∈ St¨\S′t¨ ⊆ Ci
(
R′, t¨− 1) and Ci (R′, t¨− 1) ⊆ Ci (R′, t¨) by
persistence.
Now, suppose that j /∈ St¨. Note that (2) at step t¨ is equivalent to Ut¨ ⊆ U ′t¨ and U ′t¨\Ut¨ ⊆
Ci
(
R′, t¨− 1). Moreover, j /∈ S′
t¨+1
because S′
t¨+1
⊆ St¨+1. So, j ∈ U ′t¨+1 and j /∈ Nt¨+1 which implies
that j ∈ Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
because U ′
t¨+1
\Ut¨+1 ⊆ Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
.
Now, we show that O′
t¨+1
\Ot¨+1 ⊆ ht¨+1
(
Ci
(
R′, t¨
))
. Suppose b ∈ O′
t¨+1
\Ot¨+1 such that b /∈
ht¨+1
(
Ci
(
R′, t¨
))
. It must be that b /∈ O′
t¨
\Ot¨ becauseO′t¨\Ot¨ ⊆ ht¨
(
Ci
(
R′, t¨− 1)) and Ci (R′, t¨− 1) ⊆
Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
by persistence. Then, some agent, say j, departed with b at step t¨+1, ht¨+1 (j) = b, under
R but not under R′. Then, j ∈ N ′
t¨+1
\Nt¨+1 and hence, j ∈ Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
. Then, it must be the case
that b ∈ ht¨+1
(
Ci
(
R′, t¨
))
which is a contradiction.
Now, we prove (3) for step t¨+ 1 i.e. for each j ∈ N ′
t¨+1
\Ci
(
R′, t¨+ 1
)
, pt¨+1 (j) = p
′
t¨+1
(j). Take
any j ∈ N ′
t¨+1
\Ci
(
R′, t¨+ 1
)
. If agent j is persistently pointing at someone at step t¨ + 1 under
R′, we have p′
t¨+1
(j) = p′
t¨
(j). Notice that by persistence, j ∈ N ′
t¨
\Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
and, by (3) at step t¨,
pt¨ (j) = p
′
t¨
(j) so that p′
t¨+1
(j) = pt¨ (j). Moreover, pt¨ (j) /∈ Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
and so, pt¨ (pt¨ (j)) = p
′
t¨
(
p′
t¨
(j)
)
and so on. Hence, the same unsatisfied agent, say agent k, is chosen for agent j in pointing phase
of step t¨ under R and R′. Then, it must be the case that k /∈ N ′
t¨+1
\Nt¨+1 otherwise, k ∈ Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
and j ∈ Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
. Moreover, it cannot be the case that agent k is part of a trading cycle at step t¨
under R but not under R′ since then k ∈ Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
and j ∈ Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
. Since agent j is persistently
pointing at step t¨ + 1 under R′, it must be that k ∈ U ′
t¨+1
and since agent k cannot be part of a
trading cycle at step t¨ under R without being part of a trading cycle at step t¨ under R′, it must
be that k ∈ Ut¨+1. Hence, agent j must be persistently pointing at step t¨ + 1 under R as well i.e.
pt¨+1 (j) = pt¨ (j). Therefore, pt¨+1 (j) = p
′
t¨+1
(j).
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Now, suppose that agent j is not persistently pointing at step t¨ + 1 under R′. Note that it
cannot be the case that agent j is persistently pointing at step t¨+ 1 under R. Since j /∈ Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
it
cannot be the case that k ∈ Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
where k is any agent on a chain starting from agent j. Then,
for each agent k on a chain from agent j, we have pt¨ (k) = p
′
t¨
(k) from (3) at step t¨. Moreover, we
have Ut¨+1 ⊆ U ′t¨+1. So, if agent j is persistently pointing at step t¨+ 1 under R, it must be that j is
persistently pointing at step t¨+ 1 under R′ as well.
Note that it cannot be the case that in pointing phase of step t¨ + 1 under R′, the path chosen
for agent j includes some agent in Ci
(
R′, t¨+ 1
)
since then j ∈ Ci
(
R′, t¨+ 1
)
. So, no agent on a
chain starting from agent j at step t¨+ 1 under R′ can be a member of Ci
(
R′, t¨+ 1
)
. Let k ∈ Ut¨+1
be the unsatisfied agent chosen for agent j at step t¨ + 1 under R. Notice that it cannot be the
case that k ∈ Ci
(
R′, t¨+ 1
)
because k is highest priority unsatisfied agent in Ut¨+1 that agent j can
reach. Also, Ut¨+1 ⊆ U ′t¨+1 and U ′t¨+1\Ut¨+1 ⊆ Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
, so that in pointing phase of step t¨+ 1 under
R′, either agent k is chosen for agent j or some unsatisfied agent from U ′
t¨+1
\Ut¨+1 is chosen. In both
cases, it would mean that j ∈ Ci
(
R′, t¨+ 1
)
. So, k /∈ Ci
(
R′, t¨+ 1
)
and it must be that agent k is
the highest priority unsatisfied agent in U ′
t¨+1
that can be reached by agent j at step t¨ + 1 under
R′. Moreover, for each agent k ∈ N ′
t¨+1
\Ci
(
R′, t¨+ 1
)
, we have k ∈ N ′
t¨
\Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
and, so, by (4) at
step t¨, ht¨+1 (k) = h
′
t¨+1
(k). So, it must be the case that pt¨+1 (j) = p
′
t¨+1
(j).
Now, we show that (4) is true for step t¨ + 1 i.e. for each j ∈ N ′
t¨+1
\Ci
(
R′, t¨+ 1
)
, ht¨+2 (j) =
h′
t¨+2
(j). Notice that for each j ∈ N ′
t¨+1
\Ci
(
R′, t¨+ 1
)
we have j ∈ N ′
t¨
\Ci
(
R′, t¨
)
so that ht¨+1 (j) =
h′
t¨+1
(j) and pt¨+1 (j) = p
′
t¨+1
(j). So, a trading cycle consisting of agents only in N ′
t¨+1
\Ci
(
R′, t¨+ 1
)
must occur under both R and R′ at step t¨+ 1. Moreover, if any trading cycle, C, occurs under R
but not under R′ it must be the case that C ⊆ Ci
(
R′, t¨+ 1
)
. So, we have ht¨+2 (j) = h
′
t¨+2
(j) for
all j ∈ N ′
t¨+1
\Ci
(
R′, t¨+ 1
)
. This completes the proof of the Post-trade Inclusion claim. 
First, suppose that α (i) ∈ O′t′ . Since agent i is part of a trading cycle at step t′ under R′, it
must be the case that α′ (i)R′iα (i). Now, suppose that α (i) /∈ O′t′ . Since agent i is assigned α (i)
under R, there is some t˜ such that ht˜+1 (i) = α (i). By post-trade inclusion, t˜ < t
′, because Ot¨ ⊆ O′t¨
for all t¨ ∈ {t, · · · , t′}. Moreover, it must be the case that τ (R′i, O′t˜) = {α (i)} because Ot˜ ⊆ O′t˜,
O′
t˜
\Ot˜ ⊆ ht˜
(
Ci
(
R′, t˜− 1)) and α (i)Riα′ (i). So, agent i points at some agent, say agent j, holding
α (i) at step t˜ under R′ i.e. p′
t˜
(i) = j and h′
t˜
(j) = α (i). Since α′ (i) 6= α (i), j /∈ Ci
(
R′, t˜
)
and
so, by post-trade inclusion, ht˜ (j) = h
′
t˜
(j). Then, the chain initiating from agent j at step t˜ under
R′ cannot consist of any agent in Ci
(
R′, t˜
)
. So, for any agent k on a chain from agent j at step t˜
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under R′, we have k /∈ Ci
(
R′, t˜
)
. By post-trade inclusion, pt˜ (k) = p
′
t˜
(k). Then, it cannot be the
case that agent i is part of a trading cycle consisting of agent j at step t˜ under R. This contradicts
the assumption that ht˜+1 (i) = α (i).
Step 4: α′ (i) = α (i). Note that whenever α (i)Riα′ (i) and α′ (i)R′iα (i) it must be the case
that α′ (i) = α (i). Suppose not. Then, by definition of R′i, α
′ (i)P ′iα (i) because α
′ (i)R′iα (i).
Hence, α′ (i)Piα (i) which is a contradiction. So, MTC satisfies local invariance. 
By local invariance of MTC rule, Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 (presented in Chapter III), MTC rule
is strategy proof. This result is stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 2.1. For each priority ordering ≺ and (R,ω) ∈ R¯N × A, MTC≺ (R,ω) is strategy
proof.
Now, I show that MTC satisfies no justified-envy for agents with identical endowments.
Proposition 2.8. For each priority ordering ≺ and (R,ω) ∈ R¯N × A, MTC≺ (R,ω) satisfies
no justified-envy for agents with identical endowments.
Proof. On contrary, there is (R,ω) ∈ R¯N × A, priority ordering ≺ and i, j ∈ N such that
i ≺ j, ω (i) Ikω (j) for all k ∈ N and α (j)Piα (i) where α ≡ MTC≺ (R,ω). It cannot be the case
that α (j) = ω (j) because then ω (i)Piα (i) which contradicts individual rationality of MTC≺. So,
agent j must have been part of a trading cycle at least once.
Let t be the first step agent j becomes part of a trading cycle so that α (j) ∈ Ot. It cannot
be that agent i is part of a trading cycle at some t′ ≤ t since then, α (i) ∈ τ (Ri, Ot′) and hence,
α (i)Riα (j) because Ot ⊆ Ot′ . Moreover, it cannot be that agent i departed with ω (i) at some
step t′ ≤ t because then ω (i)Rib for all b ∈ Ot′ which is a contradiction. So, we have ht (i) = ω (i)
and ht (j) = ω (j). Let k ∈ Nt be the agent pointing at agent j in the trading cycle containing
agent j. Then, ω (j) ∈ τ (Rk, Ot) and so, ω (i) ∈ τ (Rk, Ot). Since agent k is not pointing at agent
i, it must be the case that agent k was pointing at agent j in step t− 1 and is pointing at agent j
in step t owing to persistence. Let tk be the first step agent k points at agent j. Since agent k is
not persistently pointing at step tk and i ≺ j, it cannot be the case that agent k points at agent j
in step tk. This completes the proof. 
The next result shows that whenever priority ordering of agents reflects social ranking of agents
in the housing market problem, MTC satisfies prioritized treatment of market-equal unsatisfied
agents.
Proposition 2.9. For each priority ordering ≺ and (R,ω) ∈ R¯N × A, MTC≺ (R,ω) satisfies
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prioritized treatment of market-equal unsatisfied agents.
Proof. Consider any priority ordering ≺, (R,ω) ∈ R¯N × A and any step of MTC≺. Let
α ≡ MTC≺ (R,ω). Since we are considering a general step, we drop sub-script of step in the
notation. Let AS = (N ′, O′) be any absorbing set at this step, where N ′ and O′ are sets of
agents and objects in the absorbing set AS, respectively, such that AS satisfies strategy proofness
compliance. Let U ⊆ N ′ be the set of unsatisfied agents in this absorbing set. Let agent i be the
highest priority unsatisfied agent in the absorbing set.
Since AS satisfies strategy proofness compliance, there is at least one cycle which has at most
two unsatisfied agents (including agent i). First, suppose each such cycle has agent i as the unique
unsatisfied agent. Let this cycle be (i1, · · · , im) such that there is an arc from each il to il+1 in the
absorbing set, im+1 = i1, and i1 = i. Then, im is either persistently pointing at agent i or she is
pointing at agent i under the pointing phase because agent i owns one of her most preferred objects
(among the remaining ones) and agent i is the highest priority unsatisfied agent in the absorbing
set. Then, im−1 is either persistently pointing at im, points directly at agent i, points at im or a
higher priority satisfied agent who has a path to agent i under the pointing phase because agent i
is the highest priority unsatisfied agent. In this manner, it can be concluded that agent i2 is either
persistently pointing at agent i3 (who has a path to agent i via pointing), points at agent i3 or
a higher priority satisfied agent who has a path to agent i via pointing. Once unique pointees of
satisfied agents have been determined, we determine unique pointees of unsatisfied agents. Either
agent i is persistently pointing at agent i2 or points at an agent holding one of her most preferred
objects with a path (via pointing) to the highest priority unsatisfied agent reachable. Since i2 holds
one of the most preferred objects for agent i, agent i either points at i2 or a higher priority satisfied
agent with a path to herself. So, α (i) ∈ τ (Ri, O′).
Now, suppose there is a cycle in the strategy proofness compliant absorbing set which has
two unsatisfied agents; agent i and j. By assumption, i ≺ k and j ≺ k for each k ∈ U\ {i, j}.
Additionally, suppose agent i is the highest priority unsatisfied agent so that i ≺ j. Let this cycle
in the absorbing set be as follows: (i1, · · · , ik, · · · , im) such that there is an arc from each il to il+1
in the absorbing set, im+1 = i1, i1 = i and ik = j. By same reasoning as for the previous case,
each agent in {ik+1, · · · , im} has a path (via pointing) to agent i. If there is a path from some
agent in {i2, · · · , ik−1} to agent i via pointing, then α (i) ∈ τ (Ri, O′). So, suppose there is no path
from an agent in {i2, · · · , ik−1} to agent i via pointing. Then, in the same manner, each agent in
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{i2, · · · , ik−1} forms a path to agent j via pointing. Now, we determine unique pointees for agents
i and j. For the agents holding one of the most preferred objects of agent i (among the remaining
ones), agent j has to be the highest priority unsatisfied agent who can be reached via pointing. So,
agent i either points at agent i2 or a higher priority agent with a path to agent j. Similarly, agent
i has to be the highest priority unsatisfied agent that can be reached by agents holding one of the
most preferred objects of agent j. So, agent j either points at agent ik+1 or a higher priority agent
with a path to agent i via pointing. In either case, we get α (i) ∈ τ (Ri, O′). 
Based on Propositions 2.6-2.9, following theorem can be stated.
Theorem 2.2. For housing market problem under weak preferences and no indifferences with
endowments, there exist rules which satisfy Pareto efficiency, weak-core selection (hence, individual
rationality), strategy proofness, no justified-envy for agents with identical endowments and priori-
tized treatment of market-equal unsatisfied agents.
I conclude this chapter in the next section.
Conclusion
When housing market problem is considered under weak preferences, several mechanisms have
been shown to satisfy desirable properties like Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, weak core
selection and strategy proofness. I consider some additional properties. I show that three of the
existing rules satisfy no justified-envy for agents with identical endowments. Additionally, I provide
sufficient conditions for a rule to satisfy weak group strategy proofness. Finally, I consider a criterion
which prioritizes how unsatisfied agents are treated in the problem. I show that this property is not
satisfied by TC, TTAS and HPO rules. I present a rule, MTC, which does satisfy this procedural
enhancement along with additional desirable properties.
In deriving this new rule, I was able to identify an oversight in the paper of Saban & Sethuraman
[27]. This oversight pertains to their sufficient conditions for strategy proofness. In the next chapter,
I explain that oversight and provide conditions which rectify this issue.
In going forward, it might be of interest to show if any existing rules other than TTAS satisfy
weak group strategy proofness especially because TTAS has an exponential running time in the
worst case. However, this chapter does prove existence of rules which satisfy Pareto efficiency,
individual rationality, weak core selection, strategy proofness, weak group strategy proofness and no
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justified-envy for agents with identical endowments. Additionally, relationship between weak group
strategy proofness and prioritized treatment of market-equal unsatisfied agents is unclear which
might require further investigation.
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CHAPTER III
A NOTE ON HOUSE ALLOCATION WITH INDIFFERENCES: A
GENERALIZATION AND A UNIFIED VIEW
Introduction
Saban & Sethuraman [27] consider the housing market problem while allowing for indifferences.
In this problem, each agent initially owns at most one object and each object is initially owned
by at most one agent. The goal is to reallocate these resources in a way that the final allocation
satisfies some desirable properties; Pareto efficiency (no agent can be made better-off without
making someone else worse-off), individual rationality (each agent receives something at least as
good as her endowment), weak core (no subset of agents can trade among themselves, each using
her endowment, such that each agent in the subset gets something better) and strategy proofness
(no agent has an incentive to misreport her preferences). They provide a class of rules for which
each member is Pareto efficient, weak core selecting (hence, individually rational) and strategy
proof. Mechanisms satisfying such properties for housing market problem with weak preferences
had already been proposed (independently) by Alcalde-Unzu &Molis [3] and Jaramillo &Manjunath
[14].
Major contributions of Saban & Sethuraman [27] include unifying the existing mechanisms
and establishing sufficient conditions for strategy proofness. They provide sufficient conditions for
strategy proofness and hence, narrow down the class of rules provided by Aziz & de Keijzer [6].
They use their sufficient conditions to come up with mechanisms that are computationally more
efficient than the mechanisms provided in earlier works. The sufficient conditions are derived
by establishing equivalence of strategy proofness with local invariance. While strategy proofness
requires that no agent has an incentive to misrepresent her preferences (in any manner), local
invariance only eliminates very specific misrepresentations. Local invariance is defined in Saban &
Sethuraman [27] as follows:
Local Invariance: Let R = (R−i, Ri) be the preference lists of the agents, where
Ri = (p1, · · · , pr) and pm represents the set of objects corresponding to agent i's mth
indifference class18. Suppose that agent i obtains object a ∈ pm (a is in agent i's mth
18For each a, b ∈ pm, aIib. Moreover, for each a ∈ pm and b ∈ pm˜, aPib if m < m˜.
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indifference class) when mechanismM is applied to the preference profile R, and suppose
aPiω (i). Let R
′ = (R−i, R′i), where R
′
i = (p1, · · · , pk−1, a, pk\ {a} , pk+1, · · · , pr). Then,
when mechanism M is applied to R′, agent i still obtains a.
Saban & Sethuraman [27] show that for mechanisms satisfying independence of unsatisfied agents
and persistence, local invariance and strategy proofness are equivalent. Following notation of Saban
& Sethuraman [27], let F be a selection rule which determines unique pointees at each step of
a mechanism. That is, let G be any graph of a housing market problem in which agents are
represented as vertices and for each vertex representing an agent, say i, edges are extended to all
vertices representing agents holding one of the most preferred objects (among the remaining ones)
of agent i. Then, F (G) represents a subgraph of G in which each vertex has a unique outgoing edge.
In any such graph G, agent i is said to be satisfied if agent i owns one of her most preferred objects
(among the remaining ones) and unsatisfied if she is not satisfied. Additionally, (a1, · · · , ak) is said
to be a path in F (G) if there is an edge from vertex al to vertex al+1 for each l ∈ {1, · · · , k − 1}.
The aforementioned properties are defined by Saban & Sethuraman [27] as follows:
Independence of unsatisfied agents: The selection rule F satisfies independence of
unsatisfied agents if for any unsatisfied agent i, and any two graphs G1 and G2 that differ
only in the outgoing edges from i, F (G1) and F (G2) can differ only in the outgoing
edge from agent i.
Persistence: Let p = (a1, · · · , ak) be a path in F (G). Then, path p is said to be
persistent if p appears in all the successive steps of the algorithm until agent ak trades
her object or leaves the problem.
Saban & Sethuraman [27] present the equivalence of strategy proofness and local invariance in
Theorem 3 which is reproduced below.
Theorem 3. A mechanism M satisfying the Independence of Unsatisfied Agents and
the Persistence properties is strategy proof if and only if it satisfies local invariance.
In the next section, I describe why the result proposed in Theorem 3 of Saban & Sethuraman [27]
may not hold, in general, and then present a mechanism which was shown to satisfy local invariance
in the previous chapter for a restricted class of preferences but, in general, is not strategy proof.
Then, I present additional restrictions under which result of the aforementioned theorem holds true.
44
Results
To prove converse of Theorem 3, Saban & Sethuraman [27] proceed as follows: Let M be a
mechanism that satisfies local invariance but not strategy proofness. Then, there is an agent i who
can report R′i ∈ R to obtain a strictly better object, say a. Let α ≡ M (R,ω) and α′ ≡ M (R′, ω)
where R′ = (R−i, R′i). Then, α
′ (i)Piα (i) where α′ (i) = a. The authors then state that, by local
invariance, it can be assumed that a is the only object in its indifference class for misreported
preferences R′i of agent i. However, by definition, local invariance requires the assigned object of
the agent to be strictly better than her endowment under the reported preferences i.e. the proof
implicitly assumes that aP ′iω (i) which may not be the case in general.
As a counter-example, I consider the Modified Top Cycles (MTC) rule which was presented
in the previous chapter. It was shown that this rule satisfies independence of unsatisfied agents,
persistence and local invariance. However, the following example shows that this rule does not
satisfy strategy proofness for weak preferences.
Example 3.1: Consider the following housing market problem: N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, O = {a, b, c, d, e},
ω = (a, b, c, d, e), 1 ≺ 2 ≺ 3 ≺ 4 ≺ 5 and the preference profile:
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R
′
4
e ab b b cde bd
a c d
Then, MTC outcome under R and R′ is (e, a, b, d, c) and (e, a, c, b, d), respectively. Agent 4 is
able to receive a better outcome by feigning to be satisfied. That is, under local invariance agents
might still have an opportunity to manipulate the rule by pretending to be satisfied i.e. reporting
their endowment as one of their most preferred objects (among the remaining ones).
Now I present a property, local push-up invariance, which is equivalent to strategy proofness
under the aforementioned restrictions on the mechanism. This property was used by Alcalde-Unzu
& Molis [3] and Jaramillo & Manjunath [14] to establish strategy proofness of their rules.
Local Push-up Preference: Consider any R ∈ RN . Let α be outcome of some mechanism
M under preferences R. R′i ∈ R is said to be local push-up preference of Ri for mechanism M if:
1. Ri|O\{α(i)} = R′i|O\{α(i)},
2. aPiα (i) if and only if aP ′iα (i) for all a ∈ O\ {α (i)}, and
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3. α (i)Ria if and only if α (i)P ′ia for all a ∈ O\ {α (i)}.
Local Push-up Invariance: A mechanism M is said to satisfy local push-up invariance if for
each R ∈ RN and i ∈ N , α (i) = α′ (i) where α ≡M (R,ω), α′ ≡M (R′, ω), R′ = (R−i, R′i) and R′i
is local push-up preference of Ri for mechanism M .
Theorem 3.1 states that local push-up invariance is equivalent to strategy proofness for mecha-
nisms satisfying independence of unsatisfied agents and persistence properties.
Theorem 3.1. A mechanism M satisfying the independence of unsatisfied agents and persis-
tence properties is strategy proof if and only if it satisfies local push-up invariance.
Proof. Consider mechanismM which satisfies independence of unsatisfied agents and persistence.
First, suppose that M satisfies strategy proofness but not local push-up invariance. Then, there is
i ∈ N and R,R′ ∈ RN , where R′ = (R−i, R′i) and R′i is local push-up preference of Ri, such that
α (i) 6= α′ (i) where α ≡ M (R,ω) and α′ ≡ M (R′, ω). Since M is strategy proof, it must be the
case that α′ (i)R′iα (i). Since α (i) 6= α′ (i), by definition of local push-up preference, α′ (i)P ′iα (i)
which implies that α′ (i)Piα (i). This contradicts strategy proofness of M .
To show the converse, suppose that M satisfies local push-up invariance but not strategy proof-
ness. Then, there is i ∈ N and R,R′ ∈ RN , where R′ = (R−i, R′i), such that α′ (i)Piα (i) where
α ≡ M (R,ω) and α′ ≡ M (R′, ω). Then, by local push-up invariance, we can assume that α′ (i)
is the only object in its indifference class for preferences R′i. The remaining proof follows from
Theorem 3 of Saban & Sethuraman [27]. 
It should be noted that local push-up invariance implies local invariance but not vice versa.
Next, I present additional restrictions under which local invariance is equivalent to local push-up
invariance so that result of Theorem 3 from Saban & Sethuraman [27] holds true under these
conditions. One possible solution is to restrict attention to only those preference profiles for which
endowment is the only object in its indifference class for each agent. I refer to this class of preferences
as no indifferences with endowment. For this restricted class of preferences, local invariance and local
push-up invariance are obviously equivalent. Before proceeding further, I provide some additional
notation.
Some Notation: Consider any R,R′ ∈ RN . Let Nt˜ (resp. N ′t˜) and Ot˜ (resp. O′t˜) be set of
agents and objects, respectively, remaining at step t˜ under R (resp. R′). Let ht˜ (resp. h
′
t˜
) denote
objects held by agents at step t˜ under R (resp. R′). For i ∈ Nt˜ (resp. N ′t˜), let pt˜ (i) (resp. p′t˜ (i))
be the agent pointed at by agent i at step t˜ under R (resp. R′). Let t (resp. t′) be the first step
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agent i becomes satisfied or part of a trading cycle under R (resp. R′). For any R ∈ RN and step
t˜, denote all agents having a path to agent i via pointing (including agent i) as Ci
(
R, t˜
)
i.e.
Ci
(
R, t˜
)
=

j ∈ Nt˜ :
j = i
pt˜ (j) = i
pt˜ (pt˜ (j)) = i
...
Before presenting additional restrictions, I return to the housing market example to provide
some intuition for the following restrictions. Under MTC, agent 4 had an opportunity to benefit
by pretending to be satisfied because she was able to get an additional agent, agent 5, to point
at her. Intuitively, such incentives need to be eliminated in order to achieve strategy proofness.
Consider the following requirement:
Ineffective Status Change (Agents): At each step t ≤ t˜ < t′, any R ∈ RN , R′ = (R−i, R′i)
where R′i is local push-up preference of Ri under ruleM , if j ∈ N ′t˜\Ci
(
R′, t˜
)
, then j ∈ Nt˜. Moreover,
if pt˜ (j) = k, then p
′
t˜
(j) = k.
Ineffective status change (agents) makes sure that no agent is able to attain additional pointers
by misreporting her preferences. Another possible way to achieve this would be to use an object
variant of the above property:
Ineffective Status Change (Objects): At each step t ≤ t˜ < t′, any R ∈ RN , R′ = (R−i, R′i)
where R′i is local push-up preference of Ri under ruleM , if j ∈ N ′t˜\Ci
(
R′, t˜
)
, then j ∈ Nt˜. Moreover,
if pt˜ (j) = k, then h
′
t˜
(
p′
t˜
(j)
)
= ht˜ (k).
Under ineffective status change (objects), instead of each agent pointing at the same agent under
both preference profiles, each agent may point at different agents under the two preference profiles
but the object held by these agents are the same. In fact, the two variants of ineffective status
change are same as two of the sufficient conditions of local invariance provided in Theorem 4 of
Saban & Sethuraman [27]. I use these conditions to show that class of rules presented in Saban &
Sethuraman [27] are still strategy proof. The next result shows that under each of aforementioned
conditions, local invariance is equivalent to local push-up invariance and hence, strategy proofness
from Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.2. For a mechanism M satisfying independence of unsatisfied agents and persis-
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tence properties, local invariance is equivalent to local push-up invariance (equivalently, strategy
proofness) if:
1. there are no indifferences with endowment,
2. M satisfies ineffective status change (agents), or
3. M satisfies ineffective status change (objects).
Proof. Under (1), equivalence of local invariance and local push-up invariance is obvious.
Since local push-up invariance implies local invariance, for (2) and (3), we need to prove that local
invariance implies local push-up invariance. Suppose that M satisfies local invariance but not local
push-up invariance. Then, there is i ∈ N and R,R′ ∈ RN , R′ = (R−i, R′i) and R′i is local push-up
preference of Ri for mechanismM , such that α (i) 6= α′ (i) where α ≡M (R,ω) and α′ ≡M (R′, ω).
Since M satisfies local invariance, it must be the case that α (i) Iiω (i). Moreover, by definition of
local push-up preference, we have either α′ (i)P ′iα (i) or α (i)P
′
iα
′ (i). Since Ri|O\{a(i)} = R′i|O\{a(i)}
and Rj = R′j for all j ∈ N\ {i}, steps of M under R and R′ are identical until all a ∈ O such that
aPiα (i) have been removed19. Then, it cannot be the case that α′ (i)P ′iα (i) because, by definition
of local push-up preference, α′ (i)Piα (i) and so, agent i should be able to receive α′ (i) under R as
well. Also, note that if α (i) = ω (i), then α′ (i) = ω (i). So, suppose that α (i) 6= ω (i).
Now, suppose that α (i)P ′iα
′ (i). Then, it must be the case that α′ (i) I ′iω (i) and α
′ (i) Iiω (i).
Again, steps ofM under R and R′ are identical until all a ∈ O such that aPiα (i) have been removed.
Let t¯ be the first step such that each a ∈ O with aPiα (i) has been removed from the problem under
R and R′. Then, Nt¯ = N ′¯t , Ot¯ = O
′¯
t and ht¯ = h
′¯
t
20. Moreover, for all a ∈ Ot¯\ {α (i)}, α (i)Ria and
α (i)P ′ia. Since α (i) Iiω (i), α (i)P
′
iω (i) and ht¯ (i) = ω (i), i ∈ St¯ and i ∈ U ′¯t i.e. t¯ = t < t′ where
t (resp. t′) is the first step agent i becomes satisfied or part of a trading cycle under R (resp. R′)
for mechanism M .
We show that following is true forM under both ineffective status change (agents) and ineffective
status change (objects) for all t˜ ∈ {t, · · · , t′ − 1}:
1.
Nt˜ ⊆ N ′t˜
Nt˜\N ′t˜ ⊆ Ci
(
R′, t˜− 1) and Ot˜ ⊆ O
′
t˜
O′
t˜
\Ot˜ ⊆ ht˜
(
Ci
(
R′, t˜− 1)) ,
19Until all such objects have been removed, at each step, set of remaining agents and objects are same, pointing
decisions are same for all agents and hence, same cycles occur under R and R′.
20Since α (i) 6= ω (i), it must be the case that α (i) ∈ Ot¯.
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2. for each j ∈ N ′
t˜
\Ci
(
R′, t˜
)
, pt˜ (j) = p
′
t˜
(j), and
3. for each j ∈ N ′
t˜
\Ci
(
R′, t˜
)
, ht˜+1 (j) = h
′
t˜+1
(j).
Additionally, (1) is true for step t′.
First let t˜ = t. Since t¯ = t, we have Nt˜ = N
′
t˜
, Ot˜ = O
′
t˜
and ht˜ = h
′
t˜
. So, (1) holds. Now we
show that (2) is true under both; ineffective status change (agents) and ineffective status change
(objects). By ineffective status change (agents), we have pt˜ (j) = p
′
t˜
(j) for all j ∈ N ′
t˜
\Ci
(
R′, t˜
)
and
so, (2) holds at step t˜ = t. Since ht˜ = h
′
t˜
, we have pt˜ (j) = p
′
t˜
(j) for all j ∈ N ′
t˜
\Ci
(
R′, t˜
)
under
ineffective status change (objects) as well. By ht˜ = h
′
t˜
and (2) at step t˜, we get (3) at step t˜.
Now, suppose that (1)-(3) hold for each t˜ such that t ≤ t˜ < t′−1. We want to show that (1)-(3)
are true for step t˜ + 1. Note that any cycle that occurs at step t˜ under R but not under R′ must
consist entirely of agents in Ci
(
R′, t˜
)
. So, (1) is true at step t˜ + 1. Now, we show that (2) holds
for both; ineffective status change (agents) and ineffective status change (objects). By ineffective
status change (agents), we have (2) at step t˜+1. For ineffective status change (objects), consider any
j ∈ N ′
t˜+1
\Ci
(
R′, t˜+ 1
)
. Let p′
t˜+1
(j) = k. Then, it must be the case that k ∈ N ′
t˜+1
\Ci
(
R′, t˜+ 1
)
and, by persistence, k ∈ N ′
t˜
\Ci
(
R′, t˜+ 1
)
. Then, by (3) at step t˜, ht˜+1 (k) = h
′
t˜+1
(k) and so,
pt˜+1 (j) = p
′
t˜+1
(j) by ineffective status change (objects). Then, by (3) at step t˜ and (2) at step
t˜ + 1, we have (3) at step t˜ + 1. At step t′ − 1, any cycle that occurs under R but not under R′
must consist entirely of agents in Ci (R′, t′ − 1). So, we have (1) at step t′.
Now, let ti be the step agent i departs under R. It cannot be the case that ti > t′ because
Oti ⊆ Ot′ and Ot′ ⊆ O′t′ . So, α (i) ∈ O′t′ . Agent i becomes satisfied or part of trading cycle at
step t′ under R′ and so, α′ (i)R′iα (i) which is a contradiction. Now suppose that ti ≤ t′. Let
t¨i be the last step agent i becomes part of a trading cycle under R. Denote this cycle as C. It
must be the case that t ≤ t¨i < ti. Since ti ≤ t′, agent i is not part of a trading cycle at step t¨i
under R′ so that C is not a trading cycle at step t¨i under R′. Then, it must be the case that C
consists entirely of agents in Ci
(
R′, t¨i
)
. Then, it must be the case that α (i) ∈ h′
t¨i
(
Ci
(
R′, t¨i
))
. If
not, we have α (i) ∈ h′
t¨i
(
N ′
t¨i
\Ci
(
R′, t¨i
))
i.e. there is j ∈ N ′
t¨i
\Ci
(
R′, t¨i
)
such that h′
t¨i
(j) = α (i).
Since j ∈ N ′
t¨i
\Ci
(
R′, t¨i
)
, by persistence, it must be the case that j ∈ N ′
t¨i−1\Ci
(
R′, t¨i − 1
)
. Then,
by (3) at step t¨i − 1, we have ht¨i (j) = h′t¨i (j). This implies that j ∈ C which is a contradiction.
Since α (i) ∈ h′
t¨i
(
Ci
(
R′, t¨i
))
, by persistence, it must be the case that α′ (i)R′iα (i) which is a
contradiction. This completes the proof. 
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An immediate corollary of the above theorem is that MTC is strategy proof when considering
class of preferences with no indifferences with endowment because in that case, local invariance is
equivalent to local push-up invariance. Let R¯ denote the set of preferences for which there are no
indifferences with endowment, A be the set of all possible assignments and ≺ be priority ordering
over agents.
Corollary 3.1. For any (R,ω) ∈ R¯N × A and priority ordering ≺ over agents, MTC≺ (R,ω)
is strategy proof.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I identify an oversight in Saban & Sethuraman [27]. I provide conditions under
which results of Saban & Sethuraman [27] hold true. An earlier version of this note was made
available to Daniela Saban and Jay Sethuraman. Appropriate revisions have been made in their
paper to rectify the oversight.
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CHAPTER IV
FRACTIONAL HOUSING MARKET WITH SINGLE AND
DISCRETE ENDOWMENTS
Introduction
In this chapter, I study the problem of reallocating goods to agents in a manner which satisfies
some desirable properties. In particular, I consider the problem where each agent owns an object
and has preferences over the set of objects and each object is owned by one agent. The goal is
to reassign these objects in a manner which satisfies some desirable properties such as: Pareto
efficiency (not possible to make someone better-off without making someone worse-off), individual
rationality (each agent gets something at least as good as her endowment), strategy proofness (truth-
telling is a weakly dominant strategy) and core stability (not possible for any group of agents to
achieve a better assignment by trading among themselves). In literature, such models of exchange
economy of goods are commonly referred to as the housing market. Housing market is widely used
in the kidney exchange markets [26].
Shapley & Scarf [28] proposed Top Trading Cycles (TTC) rule which is attributed to David
Gale. Under strict preferences, outcome of TTC is the unique allocation in the core and it is also
the unique competitive allocation [24]. Moreover, TTC rule is strategy proof [23] and it is the only
rule which satisfies Pareto efficiency, individual rationality and strategy proofness [17].
Considerable amount of work has been done to extend the housing market problem. Alcalde-
Unzu & Molis [3] and Jaramillo & Manjunath [14] independently proposed generalizations of TTC
rule; Top Cycles (TC) rule and Top Trading Absorbing Sets (TTAS) rule, respectively, which
allow for indifferences in preferences for the housing market problem. These rules are Pareto
efficient, weak core selecting (hence, individually rational), strategy proof and core selecting (when
core is non-empty) [3, 6, 14]. Saban & Sethuraman [27] present sufficient conditions to achieve
strategy proofness when considering housing market with indifferences. In doing so, they are able
to present a class of rules; common ordering on agents, individual ordering on objects (CAIO),
for which each member is Pareto efficient, weak core selecting (hence, individually rational) and
strategy proof 21. Moreover, they propose a member of CAIO, Highest Priority Object (HPO)
21TC and TTAS rules are members of CAIO.
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rule, which is computationally quicker than TC and TTAS. Each member of CAIO is an iterative
algorithm where each iteration has three phases: departure phase, a set of agents are chosen to
depart if they hold one of their most preferred objects (among the remaining ones) and all their
most preferred objects (among the remaining ones) are held by that set of agents; pointing phase,
priority orderings22 over agents and/or objects are used to determine a unique pointee for each
agent; trading phase, trades occur based on the cycles formed in the pointing phase.
Another extension to the housing market problem is to consider random assignment solutions
rather than deterministic assignment solutions. In a deterministic assignment solution, an object
is assigned to an agent or not whereas for a random assignment solution, an agent can be assigned
fractions of an object. Random assignment solutions are of significance because such solutions allow
to consider fairness properties in a meaningful manner which may not be possible for deterministic
assignment solutions. For a random assignment solution, fractions of assigned objects can be
interpreted as partial ownership or probability of receiving the object. Random assignment solutions
to housing market problem have been studied in various settings.
Abdulkadiroglu & Sonmez [1] and Bogomolnaia & Moulin [9] consider the problem where agents
do not own objects. Such problems are referred to as random assignment problem in literature.
Abdulkadiroglu & Sonmez [1] present a mechanism which is strategy proof, ex-post Pareto efficient
and satisfies equal treatment of equals. Bogomolnaia & Moulin [9] propose a mechanism which is
ordinally efficient, envy-free and satisfies weak strategy proofness. Katta & Sethuraman [15] extend
this problem to weak preferences and show that weak strategy proofness conflicts with ordinal
efficiency and envy-freeness.
Recently, several papers have considered random assignment solution to the housing market
problem. Yilmaz [33] explores this problem while allowing for indifferences. They present a rule
which is individually rational, ordinally efficient and satisfies no justified-envy. No-envy is a central
notion of fairness in economics. It requires that no agent likes (envies) assignment of another agent
better than her own. However, when agents own endowments, no-envy is incompatible with indi-
vidual rationality. Yilmaz [32] introduced the notion of no justified-envy. No justified-envy requires
that an agent can envy another agent only if her assignment is individually rational for the other
agent. So, no justified-envy is weaker than no-envy but is compatible with individual rationality.
However, individual rationality, strategy proofness and no justified-envy are incompatible in this
22These are complete, transitive and antisymmetric orderings.
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setting [32, 33].
Athanassoglou & Sethuraman [4] study the housing market problem, while allowing for indif-
ferences, where agents may initially own fractions of objects. They present a mechanism which
satisfies ordinal efficiency, individual rationality and no justified-envy. They also prove three im-
possibility results: (1) for at least 3 agents, any mechanism which satisfies individual rationality,
ordinal efficiency and no justified-envy cannot satisfy weak strategy proofness23, (2) for at least 4
agents, there is no mechanism which satisfies individual rationality, ordinal efficiency and strategy
proofness, and (3) for at least 5 agents, any mechanism satisfying individual rationality and ordi-
nal efficiency cannot simultaneously satisfy no justified-envy and no-envy for agents with identical
endowments. Additionally, these impossibility results hold even under the restricted case of strict
preferences.
Aziz [5] generalizes Top Trading Cycles rule for the housing market problem with fractional
endowments while allowing for indifferences. One particular contribution of Aziz [5] is to define
core using stochastic dominance relation which they refer to as SD-core stability. They present
a mechanism, Fractional Top Trading Cycles (FTTC) rule, which is SD-core stable and ordinally
efficient. They show that FTTC satisfies maximal set of desirable results by presenting two impos-
sibility results: (1) there is no mechanism that satisfies SD-core stability and no justified-envy, and
(2) there is no mechanism which satisfies individual rationality, ordinal efficiency and weak strategy
proofness. Additionally, these results hold even for strict preferences and single unit allocations
and endowments [5]. However, FTTC is not in general a fractional solution to the housing market
problem. In fact, when endowments are single and discrete, FTTC reduces to Plaxton's mechanism
which is a class of deterministic rules for the housing market problem with indifferences [5].
Notably, several impossibility results have been established for random assignment solution to
the housing market problem and several of these results hold even when endowments are single
and discrete and preferences are strict. In this chapter, I consider random assignment solution to
the housing market problem with single and discrete endowments for a restricted class of prefer-
ences; trichotomous preferences. Under trichotomous preferences, each agent considers an object
as being acceptable or unacceptable. Additionally, I assume that each agent finds each acceptable
object to be better than her endowment and her endowment to be better than each unacceptable
object i.e. there are three indifference classes for each preference ordering. So, trichotomous pref-
23This impossibility result holds even for the case of single endowments.
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erences, like strict preferences, are an extreme case of the full preference domain. I consider this
class of preferences for several reasons. First, multiple impossibility results have been established
for random assignment solutions to the housing market problem even for strict preferences and
single and discrete endowments. So, it seems natural to consider another extreme case of the full
preference domain to determine whether these impossibility results still hold. As we show later on,
the aforementioned impossibility results do not hold for this setting. Secondly, for trichotomous
preferences, probability of being assigned acceptable objects can be used as the canonical utility
representation. Thirdly, trichotomous preferences can arise in real-life situations; housemates as-
signing rooms, preferences over dorm-rooms in hostels, etc. More importantly, kidney exchange
can be argued to have trichotomous preferences. Some of the most important criteria to determine
whether a kidney is acceptable for a patient are: blood type, cross-matching and tissue type. Of
these three criteria, blood type and cross-matching are binary i.e. based on these a kidney is either
acceptable or unacceptable for a patient. Tissue type, on the other hand, compares six basic tissue
antigens between donor and the patient where the best match would be to have all six antigens
matching. However, successful transplants are possible even if there are no matching tissue antigens
between donor and the patient.
I present the model and some relevant notation in the next section.
Model
I consider the fractional housing market problem with single and discrete endowments. In this
problem, each agent initially owns one object, each object is initially owned by one agent and each
agent is to be assigned fractions of objects adding up to one. These fractions of objects can be
considered as probability of receiving an object or a part-time assignment of an object. Let N and
O denote set of agents and objects, respectively. Let ω denote the vector of endowment of agents
in N and ωi represent endowment of agent i. For each i ∈ N , I represent preferences as Ri, R′i, etc.
Strict and indifference relations associated with Ri are denoted as Pi and Ii, respectively. Moreover,
R = (Ri)i∈N represents preference profile. In this chapter, I assume agents to have trichotomous
preferences where each agent considers an object to be acceptable or unacceptable. Agents are
indifferent between acceptable objects and also between unacceptable objects. Moreover, I assume
that each agent prefers every acceptable object to her endowment and prefers her endowment to
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each unacceptable object. Let T be the set of all possible trichotomous preferences24. For any
Ri ∈ T , let A (Ri) denote the set of acceptable objects under Ri. Then, for any a, b ∈ A (Ri), aIib.
Moreover, if a, b /∈ A (Ri) and ωi /∈ {a, b}, then agent i considers objects a and b to be unacceptable
and aIib. Finally, for each a ∈ A (Ri) and b /∈ A (Ri) ∪ {ωi}, we have aPiωi, aPib and ωiPib. An
interesting aspect of these preferences is that preferences of any agent can be described completely
by the set of objects that she finds acceptable. Additionally, probability of being assigned acceptable
objects can be used as the canonical utility representation.
An allocation is said to be a deterministic assignment if each agent receives exactly one object
and each object is allocated to exactly one agent. Each deterministic assignment can be represented
as a n × n permutation matrix [αi,a]i∈N,a∈O such that for each i ∈ N and a ∈ O, αi,a ∈ {0, 1}25,∑
i∈N αi,a = 1 and
∑
a∈O αi,a = 1. When assignment α is deterministic, with a slight abuse of
notation, I use αi to denote the object assigned to agent i. Let A be the set of all possible determin-
istic assignments. I use α, β, etc. to represent deterministic assignments. As mentioned already,
endowment is represented as ω and by assumption, ω ∈ A. Then, a deterministic assignment
mechanism for the housing market problem with single and discrete endowments is a mapping from
T N ×A to A for trichotomous preferences.
A random assignment x = [xi,a]i∈N,a∈O is a n× n stochastic matrix satisfying the following:
1. xi,a ∈ [0, 1] for each i ∈ N and a ∈ O,
2.
∑
a∈O xi,a = 1 for each i ∈ N , and
3.
∑
i∈N xi,a = 1 for each a ∈ O.
For random assignment x, xi,a represents probability with which agent i is assigned object a.
Moreover, agent i's assignment under random assignment x is represented as xi = (xi,a)a∈O. Let
X be the set of all random assignments. Then, X is the convex hull of A. I use x, y, z, etc. to
represent random assignments. Additionally, for any i ∈ N , random allocation x0 and preferences
R0 ∈ R, let U (R0, x0) =
∑
a∈A(R0) x0,a i.e. U (R0, x0) represents the probability of receiving an
acceptable object for preferences R0 under x0. Moreover, let:
Wi (R0, x0) = U (R0, x0) + x0,ωi
24Trichotomous preferences are identical to the preferences considered in Bogomolnaia & Moulin [10].
25αi,a represents allocation of object a to agent i under α.
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That is, Wi (R0, x0) represents the probability with which agent i receives an object at least as
good as her endowment according to preferences R0 under the random assignment x0. Then, for
the housing market problem (R,ω) ∈ T N ×A and random assignment x ∈ X , U (Ri, xi) represents
probability with which agent i receives an acceptable object under allocation xi and Wi (Ri, xi)
represents probability with which agent i receives an object at least as good as her endowment
under allocation xi. Additionally, let U (R, x) = (U (Ri, xi))i∈N and W (R, x) = (Wi (Ri, xi))i∈N
for any R ∈ T N and x ∈ X .
Then, a random assignment mechanism for the housing market problem with single and discrete
endowments is a mapping from T N ×A to X for trichotomous preferences. I refer to the problem
of finding a random assignment solution to the housing market problem with single and discrete en-
dowments as the fractional housing market problem with single and discrete endowments. Moreover,
each such problem can simply be represented as (R,ω) ∈ T N ×A for trichotomous preferences.
Properties
Before describing appropriate properties for random assignment mechanisms, I extend prefer-
ences of agents over O to preferences over X . Standard method of comparing random assignments
is to use the stochastic dominance relation. For any i ∈ N , Ri ∈ R and x, y ∈ X , agent i likes xi
at least as much as yi if and only if xi stochastically dominates yi with respect to Ri i.e.
∑
aRib
xi,a ≥
∑
aRib
yi,a ∀b ∈ O
Moreover, when simply comparing assignment of agent i for random assignments x and y, I
denote x at least as good as y for agent i as x i y. Additionally, to show that agent i likes
assignment of agent j at least as much as that of agent k under random assignment x, I use the
notation of xj i xk. Additionally, if
∑
aRib
xi,a ≥
∑
aRib
yi,a for each b ∈ O and
∑
aRib
xi,a >∑
aRib
yi,a for some b ∈ O, then agent i strictly prefers x to y which is denoted as x i y. If x i y
and y i x, then agent i is indifferent between random assignments x and y. I denote this as x ∼i y.
Following Bogomolnaia & Moulin [10], for any reported preferences, I restrict attention to as-
signments under which each agent receives only those objects which are at least as good as her
endowment i.e. for any i ∈ N , Ri ∈ T and x ∈ X , xi,a > 0 if and only if a ∈ A (Ri) ∪ {ωi}.
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Additionally, I assume that agents have an aversion to receiving an unacceptable object with pos-
itive probability. Formally, for any i ∈ N , Ri ∈ T and x, y ∈ X such that Wi (Ri, xi) = 1 and
Wi (Ri, yi) < 1, xi i yi. Then, for any random assignments satisfying these assumptions, say
x, y ∈ X , x i y if and only if U (Ri, xi) ≥ U (Ri, yi)26.
A deterministic assignment α is said to be Pareto efficient if there is no β ∈ A such that βiRiαi
for each i ∈ N and βiPiαi for some i ∈ N . Random assignment x is said to be SD-efficient if there
is no y ∈ X such that y i x for each i ∈ N and y i x for some i ∈ N . A mechanism is SD-
efficient if it chooses a SD-efficient assignment for every (R,ω) ∈ T N ×A. A random assignment
is said to be ex-post efficient if it can be represented as a probability distribution over Pareto
efficient deterministic assignments. A mechanism is ex-post efficient if, for every (R,ω) ∈ T N ×A,
it chooses an assignment which is ex-post efficient. A random assignment is said to be ex-ante
efficient if for every profile of utility functions consistent with preference profile of agents, the
expected utility vector is Pareto efficient. Since probability of receiving an acceptable object can
be used as the canonical utility representation for trichotomous preferences, random assignment
x is ex-ante efficient if there is no y ∈ X such that U (Ri, yi) ≥ U (Ri, xi) for each i ∈ N and
U (Ri, yi) > U (Ri, xi) for some i ∈ N . A mechanism is said to be ex-ante efficient if, for every
(R,ω) ∈ T N ×A, it chooses an ex-ante efficient assignment.
A deterministic assignment α is said to be individually rational if αiRiωi for each i ∈ N i.e.
each agent receives an object at least as good as her endowment. A random assignment x is said
to be SD-individually rational (SD-IR) if Wi (Ri, xi) = 1 for each i ∈ N . A mechanism is said
to be SD-IR if it chooses SD-IR assignment for every (R,ω) ∈ T N × A. A random assignment
is said to be ex-post individually rational (ex-post IR) if it can be represented as a probability
distribution over individually rational deterministic assignments. A mechanism is ex-post IR if, for
every (R,ω) ∈ T N ×A, it chooses an ex-post IR assignment. A random assignment x is said to be
ex-ante individually rational (ex-ante IR) if W (Ri, xi) = 1 for each i ∈ N . A mechanism is ex-ante
IR if, for each (R,ω) ∈ T N ×A, it chooses an ex-ante IR assignment.
A random assignment mechanism is said to be SD-strategy proof if truthful revelation of pref-
erences is a weakly dominant strategy for each agent i.e. ϕ : RN × A → X is SD-strategy proof
if for each R ∈ T N , i ∈ N and R′i ∈ T , ϕ (R,ω) i ϕ (R′, ω) where R′ = (R−i, R′i). A random
assignment mechanism is said to be weakly SD-strategy proof if for every agent, allocation received
26This is because I am assuming Wi (Ri, xi) =Wi (Ri, yi) = 1.
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by truthful revelation is not dominated by allocation obtained by reporting any other preference
i.e. ϕ : RN × A → X is weakly SD-strategy proof if for each R ∈ T N , i ∈ N and R′i ∈ T ,
ϕ (R′, ω) i ϕ (R,ω) where R′ = (R−i, R′i)27. Moreover, rule ϕ : RN × A → X is ex-ante strat-
egy proof if for each R ∈ T N , i ∈ N and R′i ∈ T , U (Ri, ϕi (R,ω)) ≥ U (Ri, ϕi (R′, ω)) where
R′ = (R−i, R′i).
For any (R,ω) ∈ T N × A, a deterministic assignment α ∈ A is said to be blocked by coalition
S ⊆ N if there is β ∈ A such that {βi : i ∈ S} = {ωi : i ∈ S} and βiPiαi for each i ∈ S. An
allocation is said to be in the weak core if it is not blocked by any subset of N . A random assignment
is said to be in the ex-post weak core if it can be represented as a probability distribution over
deterministic assignments in the weak core. A random assignment x ∈ X is said to be in SD-core
if there is no coalition S ⊆ N and y ∈ X such that ∑i∈S yi = ∑i∈S ωi and y i x for each i ∈ S.
Additionally, a random assignment x ∈ X will be said to be in ex-ante core if there is no coalition
S ⊆ N and y ∈ X such that ∑i∈S yi = ∑i∈S ωi and U (Ri, yi) > U (Rixi) for each i ∈ S.
A random assignment is said to be envy-free if each agent prefers her allocation to every other
agent's allocation. That is, a random assignment x ∈ X is said to be envy-free if for each i, j ∈
N , xi i xj . However, for the housing market problem, envy-freeness conflicts with individual
rationality. This can be established by the following example:
Example 4.1: Let N = {1, 2}, O = {a, b}, ω = (a, b) and preference profile be:
R1 R2
a a
b b
In this housing market problem, any assignment for which agent 2 does not envy agent 1 would
not be individually rational for agent 1.
So, it would be reasonable to consider no-envy for agents with identical endowments (NEIE )
i.e. a random assignment x ∈ X satisfies NEIE if xi i xj whenever ωiIhωj for each h ∈ N\ {i, j}28
and ωj ∈ A (Ri) if and only if ωi ∈ A (Rj). The latter condition states that there is some symmetry
in preferences of agents whose endowments are identical for every other agent. Moreover, if this
27Note that, for deterministic assignments these notions are equivalent to truthful revelation being a weakly
dominant strategy for each agent.
28It should be noted that no agent is indifferent between her endowment and any other object. I consider h ∈
N\ {i, j} instead of the usual definition because otherwise this property is trivially satisfied.
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condition is not imposed, NEIE would be incompatible even with individual rationality. Consider
the housing market problem in Example 4.1. Agents 1 and 2 have identical endowments trivially
and any assignment for which agent 2 does not envy agent 1 would not be individually rational
for agent 1. Another fairness notion usually considered in literature is equal treatment of equals
(ETE ). A random assignment is said to satisfy ETE if two agents with identical endowments and
preferences receive identical allocations. Formally, a random assignment x ∈ X satisfies ETE if for
any i, j ∈ N such that ωiIhωj for all h ∈ N\ {i, j} and A (Ri) = A (Rj)29, then xi ∼i xj . I require
A (Ri) = A (Rj) instead of Ri = Rj , as is usually the case, because there are no indifferences with
endowment. Clearly, NEIE implies ETE but converse may not be the case in general. I say a
random assignment mechanism satisfies NEIE (resp. ETE ) if it always finds an assignment which
satisfies NEIE (resp. ETE ).
Yilmaz [33] introduced an alternative notion of fairness, no justified-envy (NJE ). This notion
of fairness allows an agent to envy another's assignment only if her assignment is SD-IR for the
latter. Formally, for a random assignment x ∈ X , agent i justifiably envies agent j if xi i xj and
xi j ωj i.e. agent i does not like her allocation at least as much as agent j's and xi is SD-IR for
agent j. A random assignment mechanism is said to satisfy NJE if it finds an assignment for which
no agent justifiably envies any other agent. However, this criterion conflicts with Pareto efficiency,
strategy proofness and individual rationality even for the case of strict preferences and single and
discrete endowments. Consider the following example:
Example 4.2: Let N = {1, 2, 3}, ω = (a, b, c) and preference profile be:
R1 R2 R3
b a b
c b c
a c a
Outcome of TTC would be (b, a, c) for this housing market problem. Note that agent 3 justifiably
envies agent 1 because bP3c and cP1a. However, TTC is the only Pareto efficient, strategy proof
and individually rational mechanism for housing market problem with strict preferences [17]. As it
turns out, however, in setting of this chapter, this conflict does not arise. Additionally, I show that
no justified-envy is satisfied even when agent i is allowed to justifiably envy agent j if xj,a > 0 for
29By definition of trichotomous preferences, ωj /∈ A (Ri) and ωi /∈ A (Rj) because A (Ri) = A (Rj).
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some a ∈ A (Ri), xi,ωi > 0 and xi j ωj . This variation of NJE is clearly stronger than the notion
introduced above and is similar to ex-ante stability as defined by Kesten & Unver [16] for random
assignment solution to school choice problem.
Rules
In the recent years, several rules have been proposed for housing market problem while allowing
for indifferences. Alcalde-Unzu & Molis [3] and Jaramillo & Manjunath [14] independently proposed
Top Trading Absorbing Sets (TTAS) rule and Top Cycles (TC) rule, respectively. Both these rules
are Pareto efficient, weak core selecting and strategy proof. Moreover, these rules select from the
core whenever core is non-empty[3, 6]. Saban and Sethuraman [27] present a class of mechanisms:
common ordering on agents, individual ordering on objects (CAIO). Each member in this class
is Pareto efficient, weak core selecting and strategy proof. From this class of rules, they propose
Highest Priority Object Rule (HPO) and show that it is computationally quick. Moreover, TTAS
and TC are members of CAIO.
Each member of CAIO is an iterative algorithm where each iteration proceeds in three phases;
departure, pointing and trading. In departure phase, a set of agents, N ′, and objects, O′, may be
chosen to depart, where each agent in N ′ holds some unique object in O′ and each object in O′ is
held by some unique agent in N ′, if each agent in N ′ holds one of her most preferred objects (among
the remaining ones) and all such objects are in O′. Each departing agent is assigned the object
she is holding at that iteration of the algorithm. This phase ensures Pareto efficiency and weak
core selection. The departure phase is repeated until no more agents and objects can be chosen to
depart. In pointing phase, each agent i points at a unique agent holding one of her most preferred
objects (among the remaining ones). In presence of indifferences, it is possible that more than one
agents hold one of the most preferred objects (among the remaining ones) for agent i. For agent i,
unique agent to point at is determined by using a linear ordering over agents and/or objects while
satisfying some properties to ensure strategy proofness30. In trading phase, trades occur based on
the cycles formed in the pointing phase.
Each member of CAIO uses linear orderings over agents and/or objects31. Additionally, Saban
30Saban and Sethuraman [27] provide sufficient conditions (selection criterion for determining unique pointees) for
strategy proofness.
31TC uses priority ordering of agents whereas TTAS and HPO use priority ordering of objects
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and Sethuraman [27] also show that these priority orderings do not need to be fixed and can
be changed in a particular manner while still maintaining strategy proofness. However, I restrict
attention to rules in CAIO with fixed priority ordering structure. These rules use an ordering over
agents and for each agent, an ordering over objects. The pointing phase of these rules proceeds
as follows: Each unsatisfied agent points at the agent holding one of her most preferred objects
(among the remaining ones). If there are more than one such objects, the unsatisfied agent points
at whoever holds the highest priority object among such objects. Among satisfied agents who are
not pointing yet and have one of their most preferred objects (among the remaining ones) held by
some agent who is already pointing, the highest priority agent points at the agent holding one of
her most preferred objects (among the remaining ones). If there are more than one such objects,
the agent points at whoever holds the highest priority object among such objects32.
Let CAIOf denote these rules from the class of CAIO rules and let C be the set of all possible
priority orderings. Each member ≺∈C consists of common ordering over agents where i ≺ j is
interpreted as agent i having a higher priority than agent j and individual orderings over objects
where a ≺i b represents that object a has a higher priority than object b for agent i. Then, for any
(R,ω) ∈ T N ×A, ϕ ∈ CAIOf and ≺∈C, outcome of rule ϕ associated with priority ordering ≺ is
an n× n permutation matrix represented as ϕ≺ (R,ω).
The rule I propose in this chapter takes a lottery over specific outcomes that are achievable for
priority orderings in C. For any (R,ω) ∈ T N × A and ϕ ∈ CAIOf , let ϕ (R,ω) be the set of all
assignments achieved under the rule ϕ for priority orderings in C. Formally,
ϕ (R,ω) ≡ {ϕ≺ (R,ω) :≺∈C}
Among the assignments in ϕ (R,ω), I take a lottery over outcomes in ϕ (R,ω) which maximize
number of agents receiving an acceptable object. For any α ∈ A, let |α| represent number of agents
receiving an acceptable object under α i.e. |α| = |{i ∈ N : αi ∈ A (Ri)}|. Let set of assignments
with maximal number of agents receiving an acceptable object be represented as ϕ¯ (R,ω). Then,
ϕ¯ (R,ω) ≡ {α ∈ ϕ (R,ω) : |α| ≥ |β| ∀β ∈ ϕ (R,ω)}
The random assignment solution to the fractional housing market problem with single and
32Details of pointing phase can be found in Saban & Sethuraman [27].
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discrete endowments, (R,ω) ∈ T N ×A, is a lottery over assignments in ϕ¯ (R,ω) for some weights
pi = (piα)α∈ϕ¯(R,ω) such that piα ≥ 0 for each α ∈ ϕ¯ (R,ω) and
∑
α∈ϕ¯(R,ω) piα = 1. Then, random
assignment rule for (R,ω) ∈ T N ×A, rule ϕ ∈ CAIOf and lottery pi is represented as RAϕ,pi (R,ω)
where:
RAϕ,pi (R,ω) =
∑
α∈ϕ¯(R,ω)
piαα
Since each member of CAIO is Pareto efficient, individually rational and weak-core selecting,
RA is ex-post efficient, ex-post IR and belongs in ex-post weak core. I say a lottery pi is a uniform
distribution if for each (R,ω) ∈ T N × A, each assignment in ϕ¯ (R,ω) is given an equal weight
under pi. Formally, if pi is a uniform distribution, then for each (R,ω) ∈ T N ×A, piα = piβ for each
α, β ∈ ϕ¯ (R,ω).
Results
In this section, I provide results for the random assignment rule proposed in the previous section.
The rule proposed in the previous section takes a lottery over only specific outcomes of the rule
from CAIOf . It might be argued that taking lotteries over priority orderings could be a desirable
solution. Since rules in CAIOf are Pareto efficient, this rule would be ex-post efficient. However,
as shown in the next example, ex-post efficiency does not imply SD-efficiency, in general, even for
the case of trichotomous preferences33. This is contrary to the result of Bogomolnaia & Moulin
[10] for the two-sided matching problem under similar preference structure where they establish
equivalence between ex-post efficiency and ex-ante efficiency.
Example 4.3. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, O = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g} and ω = (a, b, c, d, e, f, g).
Consider the following preferences:
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7
be c df a f cg a
a b c d e f g
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
Then, the following assignments are Pareto efficient (even, individually rational): α1 = (b, c, d, a, e, f, g),
33I would like to thank Vikram Manjunath for this counter-example.
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α2 = (e, b, c, d, f, g, a), α3 = (c, b, d, a, f, c, g) and α4 = (b, c, f, d, e, g, a). The utility vectors
associated with these assignments, respectively, are as follows: U1 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0), U2 =
(1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1), U3 = (1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0) and U4 = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1). Now, consider the following
random assignments: x = 0.5α1 + 0.5α2 and y = 0.5α3 + 0.5α4. The utility vectors corresponding
to x and y are U (R, x) = (1, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5) and U (R, y) = (1, 0.5, 1, 0.5, 0.5, 1, 0.5). It is
obvious that random assignment x is not SD-efficient because it is dominated by the assignment y
even though x is ex-post efficient.
As illustrated in Example 4.3, ex-post efficiency does not ensure SD-efficiency. This happens
because number of agents receiving an acceptable object may differ for different Pareto efficient
assignments. This is not the case for the two-sided matching model considered in Bogomolnaia &
Moulin [10]. However, I establish that RA rule is SD-efficient because it is a lottery over Pareto
efficient and individually rational assignments with most number of agents receiving an acceptable
object. To that end, I first show that ϕ ∈ CAIOf can find every Pareto efficient and individually
rational assignment for some priority ordering in C.
Lemma 4.1. For any (R,ω) ∈ T N×A and ϕ ∈ CAIOf , if α is Pareto efficient and individually
rational, there is ≺∈C such that ϕ≺ (R,ω) = α.
Proof. Consider any (R,ω) ∈ T N ×A. Let α be any Pareto efficient and individually rational
assignment. Let Gα be a graph associated with α where each agent is represented by a node.
Moreover, for each agent i ∈ N , there is a unique arc extending to agent j such that ωj = αi.
Then, each agent receiving an acceptable object under α is part of a cycle. To reproduce α using
ϕ ∈ CAIOf , I generate priority orderings ≺ such that improving cycles34 in Gα are generated in
the first step of ϕ≺ (R,ω). For each i ∈ N , let αi ≺i a for each a ∈ O\ {αi}. Then, each agent
in an improving cycle in Gα points at the same agent as in Gα in the first step of ϕ≺ (R,ω) since
each agent in N is unsatisfied. So, all improving cycles in Gα occur in the first step of ϕ≺ (R,ω).
Note that once trades happen in accordance with the improving cycles, no other beneficial trades
can occur because α is Pareto efficient. Remaining priority orderings can be arbitrarily assigned.
Since every Pareto efficient and individually rational rule can be found using ϕ ∈ CAIOf and
some priority ordering, the result regarding SD-efficiency of RA rule can be established.
Proposition 4.1. For any (R,ω) ∈ T N × A, ϕ ∈ CAIOf and lottery pi, RAϕ,pi (R,ω) is
SD-efficient.
34Cycles where at least one agent is receiving an acceptable object.
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Proof. Consider any (R,ω) ∈ T N × A, ϕ ∈ CAIOf and lottery pi. Let x ≡ RAϕ,pi (R,ω).
On contrary, suppose that x is not SD-efficient. Then, there is y ∈ X such that y i x for each
i ∈ N and y j x for some j ∈ N . Then,
∑
i∈N U (Ri, yi) >
∑
i∈N U (Ri, xi). Note that for each
α, β ∈ ϕ¯ (R,ω), |α| = |β|. Suppose |α| = m for each α ∈ ϕ¯ (R,ω). Then, ∑i∈N U (Ri, xi) = m.
Hence,
∑
i∈N U (Ri, yi) > m. Then, it must be the case that y gives positive probability to some
individually rational assignment β ∈ A such that |β| > m. By Lemma 4.1, it must be the case that
β ∈ ϕ¯ (R,ω) which is a contradiction. 
Next, I show that SD-IR is equivalent to ex-post IR for the fractional housing market problem
with single and discrete endowments under trichotomous preferences.
Proposition 4.2. For any (R,ω) ∈ T N × A, a random assignment is SD-IR if and only if it
is ex-post IR.
Proof. (⇒) Obvious.
(⇐) Now, we show that the converse is true as well. Consider any (R,ω) ∈ T N × A. Let x
be a random assignment that satisfies ex-post IR. Then, x can be represented as a lottery over
deterministic individually rational assignments. Then:
x =
T∑
l=1
pilα
l
where for each l we have pil ≥ 0, αl ∈ A such that αliRiωi for each i ∈ N and
∑
l pil = 1. In other
words, Wi
(
Ri, α
l
i
)
= 1 for each i ∈ N and each l ∈ {1, · · · , T}. Then, we have Wi (Ri, xi) = 1 for
each i ∈ N which completes the proof. 
Since RAϕ,pi (R,ω) is ex-post IR for each lottery pi over assignments in ϕ¯ (R,ω), following result
can be stated:
Corollary 4.1. For any (R,ω) ∈ T N × A, ϕ ∈ CAIOf and lottery pi over assignments in
ϕ¯ (R,ω), RAϕ,pi (R,ω) is SD-IR.
Now, I establish that RA rule is SD-strategy proof for any lottery pi. The proof utilizes the fact
that no agent can decrease the number of agents receiving an acceptable object under RA rule and
whenever she successfully increases the number of agents receiving an acceptable object, it must be
the case that she receives an unacceptable object.
Proposition 4.3. For any (R,ω) ∈ T N × A, ϕ ∈ CAIOf and uniform distribution pi,
RAϕ,pi (R,ω) is SD-strategy proof.
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Proof. On contrary, suppose there is i ∈ N , (R,ω) ∈ T N ×A, R′i ∈ T , ϕ ∈ CAIOf and uniform
distribution pi such that x 6i x′ where x ≡ RAϕ,pi (R,ω), x′ ≡ RAϕ,pi (R′, ω) and R′ = (R−i, R′i).
For each α ∈ ϕ¯ (R,ω) and α′ ∈ ϕ¯ (R′, ω), let |α| = m and |α′| = m′. It should be obvious that m′
is the number of agents receiving an acceptable object under preference profile R′.
Since x 6i x′, it must be the case that U (Ri, xi) < 1 i.e. there is α ∈ ϕ¯ (R,ω) such that αi = ωi.
If α is Pareto efficient under R′, then m′ ≥ m. Moreover, if α is not Pareto efficient under R′,
then there is α′ ∈ A such that α′ Pareto dominates α under R′ i.e. m′ > m. Now consider the
following cases:
Case 1. m′ > m.
Consider any α′ ∈ ϕ¯ (R′, ω). It cannot be the case that α′i ∈ A (Ri) because α′ is individually
rational under R and so, m ≥ m′. Then, for each α′ ∈ ϕ¯ (R′, ω), α′i /∈ A (Ri) so that x i x′ which
is a contradiction.
Case 2. m′ = m.
Then, for any α′ ∈ ϕ¯ (R′, ω) such that α′i ∈ A (Ri), it must be the case that α′ ∈ ϕ¯ (R,ω),
by Lemma 4.1, because α′ is Pareto efficient35 and individually rational under R. Let S ≡
{α ∈ ϕ¯ (R,ω) : αi ∈ A (Ri)} and S′ ≡ {α′ ∈ ϕ¯ (R′, ω) : α′i ∈ A (Ri)}. Then, |S| ≥ |S′|. More-
over, for each α ∈ ϕ¯ (R,ω) such that αi = ωi, it must be the case that α ∈ ϕ¯ (R′, ω), by
Lemma 4.1, because α is Pareto efficient36 and individually rational under R′. Similarly, for
each α′ ∈ ϕ¯ (R′, ω) such that α′i = ωi, it has to be the case that α′ ∈ ϕ¯ (R,ω), by Lemma 4.1,
because α′ is Pareto efficient and individually rational under R. Let S˜ ≡ {α ∈ ϕ¯ (R,ω) : αi = ωi}
and S˜′ ≡ {α′ ∈ ϕ¯ (R′, ω) : α′i = ωi}. Then,
∣∣∣S˜∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣S˜′∣∣∣. Since each assignment in ϕ¯ (R,ω) is indi-
vidually rational, S ∪ S˜ = ϕ¯ (R,ω). If all assignments in ϕ¯ (R′, ω) are not individually rational for
agent i, x′i,a > 0 for some a /∈ A (Ri) ∪ {ωi}. Then, by assumption, x i x′ which is a contradic-
tion. If all assignments in ϕ¯ (R′, ω) are individually rational for agent i, S′ ∪ S˜′ = ϕ¯ (R′, ω). Since
|S| ≥ |S′|,
∣∣∣S˜∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣S˜′∣∣∣ and pi is a uniform distribution over assignments in ϕ¯ (R,ω) and ϕ¯ (R′, ω)
under preferences R and R′, respectively, it must be the case that x i x′. This concludes the
proof. 
Next, I show that any ex-post IR and SD-efficient random assignment belongs in the SD-core for
trichotomous preferences. If there is a group of agents who can trade among themselves such that
35If α′ is not Pareto efficient under R, it must be dominated by some assignment in A. However, this suggests
that m′ < m.
36If α is not Pareto efficient under R′, it must be dominated by some assignment in A. This suggests that m′ > m.
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each agent in that group gets something better-off, then, by ex-post IR, each agent in this group
receives a positive fraction of her endowment. Then, these agents could trade among themselves
using fractions of their endowments so that each agent becomes better-off. This would contradict
SD-efficiency.
Proposition 4.4. For any (R,ω) ∈ T N×A, any ex-post IR and SD-efficient random assignment
is in SD-core.
Proof. Consider any (R,ω) ∈ T N × A. Let x ∈ X be any ex-post IR (hence, SD-IR) and SD-
efficient random assignment. On contrary, suppose x is not in SD-core. Then, there is S ⊆ N and
y ∈ X such that∑i∈S yi = ∑i∈S ωi and y i x for each i ∈ S. Since y i x, we have U (Ri, xi) < 1
for each i ∈ S. Hence, xi,ωi > 0 for each i ∈ S. Note that
∑
i∈S yi,a = 1 for each a ∈ ω (S) and∑
a∈ω(S) yi,a = 1 for each i ∈ S.
Let c = mini∈S xi,ωi . Additionally, let  be an n× n matrix such that for each i ∈ N\S, i = 0
and for each i ∈ S, i = c (yi − ωi).
Let z = x+ . We show that z ∈ X . Consider the following for any a ∈ O:
∑
i∈N
zi,a =
∑
i∈N\S
zi,a +
∑
i∈S
zi,a
=
∑
i∈N\S
xi,a +
∑
i∈S
xi,a +
∑
i∈S
i,a
= 1 + c
∑
i∈S
(yi,a − ωi,a)
Consider the second term in the above expression. If a /∈ ω (S), then yi,a = 0 and ωi,a = 0 for
each i ∈ S. Additionally, if a ∈ ω (S), then ∑i∈S yi,a = ∑i∈S ωi,a = 1. So, we get ∑i∈N zi,a = 1
for each a ∈ O. Note that for any i ∈ N\S, we have zi,a = xi,a for each a ∈ O. So,
∑
a∈O zi,a = 1
for each i ∈ N\S. Now consider the following for any i ∈ S:
∑
a∈O
zi,a =
∑
a/∈ω(S)
zi,a +
∑
a∈ω(S)
zi,a
=
∑
a/∈ω(S)
xi,a +
∑
a∈ω(S)
(xi,a + i,a)
= 1 + c
∑
a∈ω(S)
(yi,a − ωi,a)
For the second term in the above expression,
∑
a∈ω(S) yi,a =
∑
a∈ω(S) ωi,a = 1. So,
∑
a∈O zi,a =
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1 for each i ∈ N . Now, we just need to show that zi,a ≥ 0 for each i ∈ N and a ∈ O. By
construction of z, zi,a = xi,a for each i ∈ N\S. So, zi,a ≥ 0 for each i ∈ N\S and a ∈ O. For any
i ∈ S and a /∈ ω (S), zi,a = xi,a. So, zi,a ≥ 0 for each i ∈ S and a /∈ ω (S). For any i ∈ S and
a ∈ ω (S), consider the following:
zi,a = xi,a + c (yi,a − ωi,a)
= xi,a − cωi,a + cyi,a
If a 6= ωi, then ωi,a = 0 and zi,a = xi,a + cyi,a ≥ 0. If a = ωi, cωi,a = c and xi,ωi ≥ c because
c = minj∈S xj,ωj . Then, zi,a ≥ 0 for each i ∈ S and a ∈ ω (S).
Therefore, zi,a ≥ 0 for each i ∈ N and a ∈ O. Moreover, it cannot be the case that zi,a > 1 for
some i ∈ N and a ∈ O because ∑i∈N zi,a = 1 for each a ∈ O and ∑a∈O zi,a = 1 for each i ∈ N .
Hence, z ∈ X .
Since zi,a = xi,a for each i ∈ N\S and a ∈ O, z ∼i x for each i ∈ N\S. Moreover, for each
i ∈ S, we have the following:
U (Ri, zi) = U (Ri, xi + c (yi − ωi))
= U (Ri, xi + cyi)
= U (Ri, xi) + cU (Ri, yi)
> (1 + c)U (Ri, xi)
We have U (Ri, xi + c (yi − ωi)) = U (Ri, xi + cyi) because ωi /∈ A (Ri) for any i ∈ N . Moreover,
since c > 0, U (Ri, zi) > U (Ri, xi) for each i ∈ S i.e. z i x for each i ∈ S. This contradicts SD-
efficiency of x and completes the proof. 
Following is an immediate corollary of Proposition 4.4.
Corollary 4.2. For any (R,ω) ∈ T N × A, ϕ ∈ CAIOf and lottery pi over assignments in
ϕ¯ (R,ω), RAϕ,pi (R,ω) is in SD-core.
Proposition 4.4 is reminiscent of the result by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [10] where they show
that a matching is core stable if and only if it is efficient and individually rational for two-sided
matching under dichotomous preferences. The preferences in their paper are identical to the
trichotomous preferences considered in this chapter. However, this equivalence result does not hold
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for the fractional housing market problem under single and discrete endowments for trichotomous
preferences. Consider the following example:
Example 4.4: Let N = {1, 2, 3}, O = {a, b, c} and ω = (a, b, c). Consider the following prefer-
ences:
R1 R2 R3
bc ac ab
a b c
Let R = (R1, R2, R3) and α = (b, a, c). Note that α belongs in the SD-core because U (R1, α1) =
U (R2, α2) = 1 i.e. agents 1 and 2 cannot be made better-off. However, α is clearly not ex-post
efficient because β = (c, a, b) Pareto dominates α.
Now, I consider the fairness notions introduced in Section 3. The next result shows that any
ex-post IR and SD-efficient random assignment satisfies the stronger notion of NJE mentioned
earlier.
Proposition 4.5. Consider any (R,ω) ∈ T N × A. An ex-post IR and SD-efficient random
assignment satisfies NJE.
Proof. On contrary, suppose there are i, j ∈ N such that xj,a > 0 for some a ∈ A (Ri),
xi,ωi > 0 and xi j ωj . Since xi j ωj , it must be the case that bRjωj for each b ∈ O such that
xi,b > 0. Specifically, we have ωi ∈ A (Rj). Let yh,b = xh,b for each h ∈ N\ {i, j} and b ∈ O.
Let c = min {xi,ωi , xj,a}. Then, set yi,b = xi,b and yj,b = xj,b for each b ∈ O\ {a, ωi} and set
yi,a = xi,a + c, yi,ωi = xi,ωi − c, yj,a = xj,a − c and yj,ωi = xj,ωi + c. Then, y ∼h x for each
h ∈ N\ {i, j}, y j x and y i x which contradicts SD-efficiency of x. 
Since RA rule satisfies ex-post IR and SD-efficiency, following result can be stated.
Corollary 4.3. For any (R,ω) ∈ T N × A, ϕ ∈ CAIOf and lottery pi over assignments in
ϕ¯ (R,ω), RAϕ,pi (R,ω) satisfies NJE.
Next, I show that RA rule satisfies NEIE. In the proof, I show that whenever agents have
identical endowments, the rule satisfies NEIE.
Proposition 4.6. For any (R,ω) ∈ T N × A, ϕ ∈ CAIOf and uniform distribution pi over
assignments in ϕ¯ (R,ω), RAϕ,pi (R,ω) satisfies NEIE.
Proof. Consider any (R,ω) ∈ T N × A, ϕ ∈ CAIOf , uniform lottery pi over assignments in
ϕ¯ (R,ω) and i, j ∈ N such that ωiIhωj for each h ∈ N\ {i, j} and ωj ∈ A (Ri) if and only if
ωi ∈ A (Rj). Let x ≡ RAϕ,pi (R,ω). We want to show that xi i xj . Suppose ωi ∈ A (Rj). Then,
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for each α ∈ ϕ¯ (R,ω), αiRiαj by Pareto efficiency. So, xi i xj .
Now, suppose that ωj /∈ A (Ri) and ωi /∈ A (Rj). If xj,a > 0 for some a /∈ A (Ri) ∪ {ωi}, then
xi  xj . Now suppose that xj,a > 0 only if a ∈ A (Ri) ∪ {ωi} and U (Ri, xj) > U (Ri, xi). Then,
it has to be the case that there is α ∈ ϕ¯ (R,ω) such that αi = ωi and αj ∈ A (Ri). Then, αj 6= ωj
and so, αj ∈ A (Rj). We construct priority orderings, ≺, such that βi ∈ A (Ri) and βj = ωj where
β = ϕ≺ (R,ω). Suppose |γ| = m for each γ ∈ ϕ¯ (R,ω). Let Gα be the graph associated with α
where each agent is represented by a node. Moreover, for each agent i′ ∈ N a unique arc is extended
to j′ ∈ N such that ωj′ = αi′ . Construct individual priority orderings over objects as follows: for
each i′ ∈ N\ {i, j} with an arc extending to an agent in N\ {j}, αi′ ≺i′ a for each a ∈ O\ {αi′}.
Then, each improving cycle which does not contain agent j occurs in pointing phase of step 1 of
ϕ≺ (R,ω). Now, consider the improving cycle containing agent j. For the agent pointing at agent
j in Gα, say agent j′ /∈ {i, j}37, ωi ≺j′ a for each a ∈ O\ {ωi}. Then, agent j′ points at agent i
in step 1 because ωj ∈ A (Rj′) and ωiIhωj for each h ∈ N\ {i, j}. Finally, for agent i, αj ≺i a for
each a ∈ O\ {αj}. Then, agent i points at the agent whose endowment is αj in the pointing phase
of step 1 of ϕ≺ (R,ω) because αj ∈ A (Ri).
Note that the only difference in cycles formed under ϕ≺ (R,ω) and improving cycles of Gα is
the cycle containing agent j in Gα. Moreover, that cycle differs only in replacement of agent j with
agent i. So, exactly m agents must be receiving an acceptable object in step 1 of ϕ≺ (R,ω) and,
by construction of ϕ¯ (R,ω), no more beneficial trades can occur after step 1 of ϕ≺ (R,ω). Hence,
ϕ≺j (R,ω) = ωj . So, for each α ∈ ϕ¯ (R,ω) such that αj ∈ A (Ri) and αi = ωi, there is β ∈ ϕ¯ (R,ω)
such that βh = αh for each h ∈ N\ {i, j, j′}, βj′ = ωi, βi = αj and βj = ωj where j′ ∈ N is such
that αj′ = ωj . Additionally, for each γ ∈ ϕ¯ (R,ω) either γj /∈ A (Ri) or γi ∈ A (Ri) i.e. γiRiγj .
Since pi is a uniform distribution over assignments in ϕ¯ (R,ω), it must be the case that xi i xj .
This completes the proof. 
Since NEIE implies ETE, following corollary can be stated.
Corollary 4.4. For any (R,ω) ∈ T N × A, ϕ ∈ CAIOf and uniform distribution pi over
assignments in ϕ¯ (R,ω), RAϕ,pi (R,ω) satisfies ETE.
The results presented in this section can be summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. For fractional housing market problem with single and discrete endowments
under trichotomous preferences, there exist rules which are SD-IR, SD-efficient, SD-strategy proof,
37This is the case because αj 6= ωj and agent i is not part of an improving cycle in Gα.
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SD-core stable and satisfy NEIE, NJE and ETE.
This states that under trichotomous preferences, the impossibility results of Yilmaz [33]; incom-
patibility of individual rationality, no justified-envy and strategy proofness, and Athanassoglou &
Sethuraman [4]; any mechanism which satisfies individual rationality, SD-efficiency and no justified-
envy cannot satisfy even weak strategy proofness, which hold under strict preferences and single and
discrete endowments, do not hold. Neither do impossibility results of Aziz [5], (1) incompatibility
of SD-core stability with NJE, and (2) SD-IR, SD-efficiency and weak SD-strategy proofness, which
hold for strict preferences even for single endowments and allocations. Moreover, by relaxing as-
sumption of fractional endowments and full preference domain to single and discrete endowments
and trichotomous preferences, the following impossibility results of Athanassoglou and Sethuraman
[4] no longer hold; (1) incompatibility of individual rationality, SD-efficiency and strategy proofness,
and (2) any individually rational and SD-efficient mechanism cannot simultaneously satisfy NJE
and NEIE.
Conclusion
I use rules in common ordering on agents, individual ordering on objects under the assumption
of trichotomous preferences and single and discrete endowments, to show that several impossibility
results for fractional housing market problem with single and discrete endowments, which hold even
under strict preferences, can be avoided.
A particular concern would be the computational complexity of the proposed rule because RA
rule requires solving for all possible priority orderings and then selecting allocations with maximal
number of agents receiving an acceptable object. Additionally, for some housing market problems,
RA rule may not provide a random assignment solution. This could occur when there is a unique
Pareto efficient assignment with maximal number of agents receiving an acceptable object. How-
ever, the goal of this chapter was to determine whether some impossibilities can be avoided for a
random assignment solution to the housing market problem under a restricted setting.
A possible way to resolve computational complexity might be to design this problem as an as-
signment problem from linear programming. Details of assignment problems in various settings can
be found in [11, 20]. However, additional constraints would be required for SD-IR and NEIE. Since
this chapter provides evidence of existence of solutions satisfying these properties, the assignment
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problem with appropriate constraints would have a solution for the setting studied in this chapter.
Moreover, by Propositions 4.4 and 4.5, this solution also satisfies SD-core stability and NJE. How-
ever, strategy proofness might be difficult to achieve using linear programming. Another possible
solution could be to design the fractional housing market problem with single and discrete endow-
ments as a multi-objective optimization problem. Marler & Arora [18] present a brief survey on
multi-objective optimization methods which is a good starting point for designing such problems.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY
In this chapter, I summarize the research presented in this dissertation. I consider housing
market problem in various settings. In housing market problem, each agent owns at most one
object and each object is owned by at most one agent. Agents have preferences over objects. I
consider the case where agents may be indifferent among objects.
In Chapter II, I show that some existing rules, in addition to several desirable properties, also
satisfy no justified-envy for agents with identical endowments. I also provide sufficient conditions for
weak group strategy proofness. Using one of these conditions, I show that Top Trading Absorbing
Sets [3] rule satisfies weak group strategy proofness. This result shows that even though Pareto
efficiency and group strategy proofness are incompatible for weak preferences [12], Pareto efficiency
and weak group strategy proofness can be achieved simultaneously. Then, I propose a procedural
enhancement, prioritized treatment of market-equal unsatisfied agents. This property directs how
trading cycles are selected at each step of the algorithm. It requires that when certain conditions are
satisfied38, the highest priority unsatisfied agent among market-equal unsatisfied agents receives one
of her most preferred objects (among the remaining ones). This property might be of importance
when agents need to be treated in accordance with their social ranking. I show that some existing
rules do not, in general, satisfy this property. So, I propose a new rule, Modified Top Cycles rule,
which satisfies this property in addition to other desirable results.
Chapter III is a note on Saban & Sethuraman [27]. UsingModified Top Cycles rule, I was able to
identify an oversight in sufficient condition for strategy proofness provided in their paper. I present
conditions which rectify this issue.
In Chapter IV, I explore random assignment solution to the housing market problem. For general
and strict preferences, several impossibility results have been established. I consider a restricted
class of preferences, trichotomous preferences. Under these preferences, each agent finds an object
(other than her endowment) to be acceptable or unacceptable. Agents are indifferent between all
acceptable objects and also unacceptable objects. Each agent prefers each acceptable object to her
endowment and prefers her endowment to each unacceptable object. These preferences are identical
to dichotomous preferences considered by Bogomolnaia & Moulin [10]. I show that for this class
38These conditions ensure that strategy proofness is not violated.
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of preferences, there are rules which satisfy efficiency, strategy proofness, core stability, no-envy for
agents with identical endowments, no justified-envy and equal treatment of equals. Hence, several
impossibility results do not hold under the assumption of trichotomous preferences for fractional
housing market problem where endowments are single and discrete.
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